A Review of Edwards's "Inquiry Into the Freedom of the Will.": Containing I. Statement of Edwards's System. II. The Legitimate Consequences of this System. III. An Examination of the Arguments Against a Self-determining Will
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abso absolute necessity absurd according action affirmed agent antece antecedents and sequents argument atheism called causation causative act cause and effect cause of volition cessity conceive connex connexion between volition consciousness consequences considered correlation direction divine volitions doctrine doctrine of necessity Dugald Stewart Edwards Edwards's system emotions endeavour eternal existence faculty fixed follows fore foreknowledge freedom future greatest apparent Hence human impossible infinite series infinite wisdom knowledge liberty likewise lition lute means metaphysical metaphysical necessity misus moral certainty moral inability moral necessity natural ability neces necessarily determined necessary connexion necessitarian necessitated nexion nisus obey opposed to necessity opposition pantheism particular determination passion perfect phenomena philosophy physical causes possible prescience present principle produce question reason and sensitivity reference relation relative respect sary sensi simply strongest motive supposed take place thing tion tive truth voli volition or choice walk wrong
Page 148 - He causeth the grass to grow for the cattle: and herb for the service of man; That he may bring forth food out of the earth...
Page 70 - A moral Agent is a being that is capable of those actions that have a moral quality, and which can properly be denominated good or evil in a moral sense, virtuous or vicious, commendable or faulty. To moral Agency belongs a moral faculty, or sense of moral good and evil, or of such a thing as desert or worthiness, of praise or blame, reward or punishment ; and a capacity which an agent has of being influenced in his actions by moral inducements or motives, exhibited to the view of understanding and...
Page 145 - This negation must be understood solely to affect a creative Deity. The hypothesis of a pervading Spirit coeternal with the universe, remains unshaken.
Page 69 - That which has the power of volition or choice, is the man or the soul, and not the power of volition itself. And he that has the liberty of doing according to his will, is the agent or doer who is possessed of the will, and not the will which he is possessed of.
Page 19 - The will, and the affections of the soul, are not two faculties; the affections are not essentially distinct from the will, nor do they differ from the mere actings of the will, and inclination of the soul, but only in the liveliness and sensibleness of exercise.
Page 273 - To suppose the future volitions of moral agents not to be necessary events ; or, which is the same thing, events which it is not impossible but that they may not come to pass ; and yet to suppose that God certainly foreknows them, and knows all things ; is to suppose God's Knowledge to be inconsistent with itself.
Page 251 - Free-agency of man, the logical inference would be, not in favour of the scheme of Necessity, but that there are some events, the foreknowledge of which implies an impossibility. Shall we venture to affirm that it exceeds the power of God to permit such a train of contingent events to take place, as his own foreknowledge shall not extend to...
Page 172 - There is scarcely a plainer and more universal dictate of the sense and experience of mankind than that, when men act voluntarily, and do what they please, then they do what suits them best, or what is most agreeable to them.
Page 18 - ... the same signification : Will seems to be a word of a more general signification, extending to things present and absent. Desire respects something absent. I may prefer my present situation and posture, suppose, sitting still, or having my eyes open, and so may will it. But yet I cannot think they are so entirely, distinct, that they can ever be properly said to run counter. A man never, in any instance, wills any thing contrary to his desires, or desires any thing contrary to his Will.