Radical Enactivism: Intentionality, Phenomenology, and Narrative : Focus on the Philosophy of Daniel D. Hutto

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Richard Menary
John Benjamins Publishing, Jan 1, 2006 - Psychology - 255 pages
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"This collection is a much-needed remedy to the confusion about which varieties of enactivism are robust yet viable rejections of traditional representationalism approaches to cognitivism and which are not. Hutto's paper is the pivot around which the expert commentators, enactivists and non-enactivists alike, sketch out the implications of enactivism for a wide variety of issues: perception, emotion, the theory of content, cognition, development, social interaction, and more. The inclusion of thoughtful replies from Hutto gives the volume a further degree of depth and integration often lacking in collections of essays. Anyone interested in assessing the current cutting-edge developments in the embodied and situated sciences of the mind will want to read this book."Ron Chrisley, University of Sussex, UK
 

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Contents

Introduction
1
Unprincipled engagements
13
Feelings and objects
39
Impossible problems and careful expositions
45
Unnatural feelings
65
Both Bradley and biology
81
Intentionality and emotion
107
Against passive intellectualism
121
Emotional experience and understanding
151
Embodied expectations and extended possibilities
157
From feeling to thinking
179
Reply to Hobson
185
Narrative practice and understanding reasons
231
Index
249
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About the author (2006)

Richard Menary is a Senior Lecturer in Philosophy at the University of Wollongong. He is the author of "Cognitive Integration" and other books.

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