Power and conflict: toward a general theory
"In a period of scholarship where most specialists dare not trespass the limits of middle-range theorizing, this author tries to revive the quest for multivariate and multilivel modelling, bringing into play his knowledge of ethnic relations and his mastery of political science literature. The graphic display of his models unveils a maze of boxes and arrows which immediately command attention and respect. There is an aura of rigor that stems from the formal-theoretic approach, and which will appeal to a substantial audience among social scientists." --Conflict Quarterly "Well written and, both for its own modeling and for Blalock's skill in drawing together the broad literature on conflict modeling, is of great value." --The Alternative Newsletter: Newsletter of the Section of Alternative Dispute Resolution Association of American Law Schools "With his usual clarity and elegance, Blalock has given us a concise, yet comprehensive, analysis of the concepts of power and conflict. He does this by developing, step-by-step, an empirically based model of the central processes and strategies affecting conflicts and their terminations. Warning against premature simplifications, he demonstrates how the necessarily complex models can be made understandable and can be used as powerful aids in explaining crucially important social events of our time." --Robin M. Williams, Jr., Cornell University "This is a book that, in many ways, will be a milestone in the development of conflict theory. It is perhaps the first systematic effort to deal with conflict from a causal perspective, one that ultimately leads to the creation of a grand causal model, based on a wide range of theories and empirical studies. . . .a major step toward a general theory of conflict. It should be read and used as a reference by anyone interested in understanding social conflict." --Peace & Change "A welcome addition to the rapidly increasing literature on the conflict processes and perhaps the most ambitious one." --Social Scientist What characteristics, if any, do social conflicts have in common? Are international and interpersonal conflicts distinct, or do they share common traits? Is a general theory of conflict possible? In Power and Conflict, Hubert M. Blalock brings his substantial work on the unification of theory and method to bear in the construction of just such a general theory. Beginning with the premise that power and conflict processes are irrevocably intertwined, he provides a systematic and comprehensive synthesis of the enormous body of literature which has developed in the field of conflict resolution. He then proceeds to construct a general theory of conflict and, in the process, discusses the generalities of a power framework, analyzes the ideology of conflict, defines the reactive and dynamic processes involved, and summarizes the various arguments and theories by creating a general model of conflict. Power and Conflict is essential reading for researchers, theorists, and students in the fields of peace studies, comparative politics, international relations, political science, and sociology.
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Power and Dependency
Mobilization Heterogeneity and Party
Reactive and Control Processes
8 other sections not shown
actually affect alternative Alternative Exchange ambiguities arms race assumed attempt become belief system Blalock blame causal diagrams chapter complex conflict groups conflict processes conflict situations consensus considerable cooperative degree of mobilization depend deterrence theory diagram discussion dominant efficiency of mobilization equation ethnocentrism example exogenous expected costs extreme fatigue levels flict function game-theory goals grievance levels highly Hutu ideo ideological dimensions ideological factors ideological system impact imply important increase instances internal involved kinds large number leaders leadership mechanisms membership mobilization effort moderate motivation to punish mutual nation nation-states negative sanctions one's opponent opposing party orientation outcome party X party X's party's members perceived perhaps position potential prior punitive behavior quasi-groups reduce reinforce relative resource depletion result role selective incentives simplistic social specific strategy subjective expected utility subjective probabilities submodel subordinate party theory third parties tion tive trust Tutsi utilities variables vulnerability Y's responses