Mental Science: A Compendium of Psychology, and the History of Philosophy ... |
Contents
| 307 | |
| 309 | |
| 339 | |
| 343 | |
| 345 | |
| 365 | |
| 370 | |
| 371 | |
| 31 | |
| 35 | |
| 36 | |
| 42 | |
| 43 | |
| 45 | |
| 49 | |
| 51 | |
| 55 | |
| 61 | |
| 79 | |
| 99 | |
| 125 | |
| 143 | |
| 149 | |
| 155 | |
| 181 | |
| 195 | |
| 198 | |
| 212 | |
| 219 | |
| 229 | |
| 236 | |
| 250 | |
| 262 | |
| 267 | |
| 273 | |
| 379 | |
| 385 | |
| 386 | |
| 407 | |
| 413 | |
| 422 | |
| 1 | |
| 3 | |
| 5 | |
| 7 | |
| 13 | |
| 19 | |
| 22 | |
| 27 | |
| 28 | |
| 30 | |
| 33 | |
| 34 | |
| 51 | |
| 58 | |
| 62 | |
| 66 | |
| 76 | |
| 84 | |
| 88 | |
| 96 | |
Other editions - View all
Common terms and phrases
abstract accompanied according acquired action active acute animal arise Aristotle asso association beauty belief body brain called cause cerebellum character circumstances colour combined condition connexion consciousness contrast degree discrimination distance distinct doctrine effect element emotion energy excitement exercise exertion experience expression fact farther favour fibres force give grey matter habit human idea ideal impression influence intel intellectual intensity J. S. Mill knowledge liberty mastication means medulla oblongata memory ment mental mind mode moral motive movements muscles muscular feelings nature nerves nervous objects odours operation organs papillæ Parmenides peculiar perception person physical Plato Platonic Realism pleasure and pain present pursuit quadrupeds reflex action regards retentiveness retina sensation sense sensibility sight smell sound Spinal Cord spontaneity stimulation Sublime substance supposed sympathy taste theory things thoughts tion touch tympanum visible vitreous humour volition voluntary white matter
Popular passages
Page 207 - For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble on some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never can catch myself at any time without a perception, and never can observe anything but the perception.
Page 28 - ... consider some particular parts or qualities separated from others, with which, though they are united in some object, yet it is possible they may really exist without them. But I deny that I can abstract...
Page 28 - I find indeed I have a faculty of imagining, or representing to myself the ideas of those particular things I have perceived and of variously compounding and dividing them. I can imagine a man with two heads or the upper parts of a man joined to the body of a horse. I can consider the hand, the eye, the nose, each by itself abstracted or separated from the rest of the body. But then whatever hand or eye I imagine, it must have some particular shape and colour.
Page 29 - A great philosopher has disputed the received opinion in this particular ; and has asserted that all general ideas are nothing but particular ones annexed to a certain term, which gives them a more extensive signification, and makes them recall, upon occasion, other individuals which are similar to them. As I look upon this to be one of the greatest and most valuable discoveries that have been made of late years in the republic of letters...
Page 316 - The passion of laughter is nothing else but sudden glory arising from some sudden conception of some eminency in ourselves, by comparison with the infirmity of others, or with our own formerly...
Page 413 - Volition, it is plain, is an act of the mind knowingly exerting that dominion it takes itself to have over any part of the man, by employing it in, or withholding it from any particular action.
Page 96 - I think, is a thinking intelligent being, that has reason and reflection, and can consider itself as itself, the same thinking thing, in different times and places...
Page 306 - Apollo; but in that form which is taken from all, and which partakes equally of the activity of the Gladiator, of the delicacy of the Apollo, and of the muscular strength of the Hercules. (For perfect beauty in any species must combine all the characters which are beautiful in that species. It cannot consist in any one to the exclusion of the rest : no one, therefore, must be predominant, that no one may be deficient.
Page 210 - Along with whatever any Intelligence knows it must, as the ground or condition of its knowledge, have some cognisance of itself.
Page 64 - There is a certain regard due to human testimony in matters of fact, and even to human authority in matters of opinion.