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abstract according ancient ancient philosophy antiquity Aristotle assumed atoms become body Cartesian Cartesian dualism causal cause Christian clearly conceived conception consciousness Deity Demokritos derived Descartes distinction divine doctrine effect elements empiricism entelechies Erdmann Essay essence eternal everything existence experience explained extension external world fact force Geschichte des Materialismus Geulinx Hence Herakleitos human knowledge human reason human thought Hume idea of substance ideal imagination immaterial important individual infinite innate intellectual intelligible Kant Kantian kind language Leibniz Locke logical Malebranche material world mathematical matter mechanical metaphysical modern philosophy Monadologie monads monistic motion nature necessity nihil objects origin outer world Pantheism phenomena Plato possible predicates principle priori pure qualities quod rational reality recognised relation scepticism Scholasticism Schopenhauer sense sensible perception Sokrates soul space Spinoza spirit starting-point substantia teleology theory things thinkers thinking tion true truth unity universe whole words
Page 230 - Since it is the understanding that sets man above the rest of sensible beings, and gives him all the advantage and dominion which he has over them; it is certainly a subject, even for its nobleness, worth our labour to inquire into.
Page 347 - Here, then, is a kind of pre-established harmony between the course of nature and the succession of our ideas; and though the powers and forces, by which the former is governed, be wholly unknown to us; yet our thoughts and conceptions have still, we find, gone on in the same train with the other works of nature.
Page 291 - Per substantiam nihil aliud intelligere possumus, quam rem quae ita existit, ut nulla alia re indigeat ad existendum.
Page 350 - Propositions of this kind are discoverable by the mere operation of thought, without dependence on what is anywhere existent in the universe. Though there never were a circle or triangle in nature, the truths demonstrated by Euclid would for ever retain their certainty and evidence.
Page 230 - Whereas, were the capacities of our understandings well considered, the extent of our knowledge once discovered, and the horizon found which sets the bounds between the enlightened and dark parts of things; between what is and what is not comprehensible by us, men would perhaps with less scruple acquiesce in the avowed ignorance of the one, and employ their thoughts and discourse with more advantage and satisfaction in the other.
Page 236 - I think it is easy to draw this observation, that the ideas of primary qualities of bodies are resemblances of them, and their patterns do really exist in the bodies themselves; but the ideas produced in us by these secondary qualities have no resemblance of them at all.
Page 346 - It is certain, that the most ignorant and stupid peasants, nay infants, nay even brute beasts, improve by experience, and learn the qualities of natural objects, by observing the effects which result from them. When a child has felt the sensation of pain from touching the flame of a candle, he will be careful not to put his hand near any candle ; but will expect a similar effect from a cause which is similar ii> its sensible qualities and appearance.
Page 350 - Matters of fact, which are the second objects of human reason, are not ascertained in the same manner; nor is our evidence of their truth, however great, of a like nature with the foregoing. The contrary of every matter of fact is still possible; because it can never imply a contradiction, and is conceived by the mind with the same facility and distinctness, as if ever so conformable to reality.
Page 352 - It is universally allowed by modern enquirers, that all the sensible qualities of objects, such as hard, soft, hot, cold, white, black, &c. are merely secondary, and exist not in the objects themselves, but are perceptions of the mind, without any external archetype or model, which they represent. If this be allowed, with regard to secondary qualities, it must also follow, with regard to the supposed primary qualities of extension and solidity; nor can the latter be any more entitled to that denomination...