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activity agnosticism analysis assert atoms awareness behavior Bergson body brain called causal chapter character cognitive common sense complex concepts connection consciousness content of perception continuity correlation critical realist datum descriptive knowledge distinction dualism dynamic Eleatic elements empirical empiricism epistemological evolutionary naturalism experience expression external fact function genetic human ical idea idealism idealist identity individual internal interpretation intuition judgments Kant knowl knowledge logical material mathematical mathematical space means mechanical ment mental metaphysical mind mind-body problem monism motion naive realism naturalist neo-realism neo-realists object of perception objective idealism organism panpsychism past perceive philosophy physical existent physical reality physical things physical world position present problem properties psychical psychology qualities reflection relations scientist sensations sense-data situation sort space spatial structure substance teleology temporal theory theory of relativity thinker thought tion tychism valid vitalist whole
Page 339 - I had formed, and how grievously was I disappointed! As I proceeded, I found my philosopher altogether forsaking mind or any other principle of order, but having recourse to air, and ether, and water, and other eccentricities.
Page 106 - As a snowflake crystal caught in the warm hand is no longer a crystal but a drop, so, instead of catching the feeling of relation moving to its term, we find we have caught some substantive thing, usually the last word we were pronouncing, statically taken, and with its function, tendency, and particular meaning in the sentence quite evaporated.
Page 236 - I find I can excite ideas in my mind at pleasure, and vary and shift the scene as oft as I think fit. It is no more than willing, and straightway this or that idea arises in my fancy; and by the :;ame power it is obliterated and makes way for another.
Page 108 - In short, the practically cognized present is no knife-edge, but a saddleback with a certain breadth of its own on which we sit perched, and from which we look in two directions into time. The unit of composition of our perception of time is a duration, with a bow and a stern, as it were — a rearward- and a forward-looking end.
Page 339 - There is surely a strange confusion of causes and conditions in all this. It may be said. indeed, that without bones and muscles and the other parts of the body I cannot execute my purposes. But to say that I do as I do because of them, and that this is the way in which mind acts, and not from the choice of the best, is a very careless and idle mode of speaking.
Page 233 - All our ideas, sensations, notions, or the things which we perceive, by whatsoever names they may be distinguished, are visibly inactive: there is nothing of power or agency included in them. So that one idea or object of thought cannot produce, or make any alteration in another. To be satisfied of the truth of this, there is nothing else requisite but a bare observation of our ideas. For since they and every part of them exist only in the mind, it follows that there is nothing in them but what is...
Page 108 - If the present thought is of ABCDEFG, the next one will be of BCDEFGH, and the one after that of CDEFGH I—the lingerings of the past dropping successively away, and the incomings of the future making up the loss.
Page 246 - Suitably to this experience, therefore, we may define a cause to be an object, followed by another, and where all the objects similar to the first are followed by objects similar to the second.
Page 274 - Thus our personality shoots, grows and ripens without ceasing. Each of its moments is something new added to what was before. We may go further: it is not only something new, but something unforeseeable.
Page 9 - The two fundamental forms of substance, ponderable matter and ether, are not dead and only moved by extrinsic force; but they are endowed with sensation and will (though, naturally, of the lowest grade); they experience an inclination for condensation, a dislike of strain; they strive after the one, and struggle against the other.