What people are saying - Write a review
We haven't found any reviews in the usual places.
Other editions - View all
actually admit argument Aristotelian Society assumption belong Bradley C. K. Ogden causal certainly clear coins commonly deny directly apprehend directly perceive distinction dogma of internal doubt exactly exist experience experienced express by saying external facts false feeling follow generalisation given thing half-crown hens hold I. A. Richards Idealists identical Identity of Indiscernibles implies inference inkstand inseparable aspect instance intrinsic nature intrinsic properties judging judgment Julius Caesar kind of value know any external law of contradiction least logically equivalent material thing meant by saying mental merely Moral Philosophy never obvious occur patch of colour perception percipi perhaps person philosophers plain plainly possess possible predicate presented object Professor James reality reason for believing reason for supposing red patch regard relational property seems sensation of blue sense sense-datum sensibles sometimes suggest surface term theory thought true ideas truth unicorn unless unreal verify wish words
Page 130 - Relations among purely mental ideas form another sphere where true and false beliefs obtain, and here the beliefs are absolute, or unconditional. When they are true they bear the name either of definitions or of principles. It is either a principle or a definition that...
Page 108 - I constantly be repeating the truth 'twice two are four' because of its eternal claim on recognition? or is it sometimes irrelevant? Must my thoughts dwell night and day on my personal sins and blemishes, because I truly have them?— or may I sink and ignore them in order to be a decent social unit, and not a mass of morbid melancholy and apology? It is quite evident that our obligation to acknowledge truth, so far from being unconditional, is tremendously conditioned.
Page 228 - This, after all, you know, really is a finger: there is no doubt about it: I know it and you all know it. And I think we may safely challenge any philosopher to bring forward any argument in favour either of the proposition that we do not know it, or of the proposition that it is not true, which does not at some point, rest upon some premiss which is, beyond comparison, less certain than is the proposition which it is designed to attack.
Page 5 - Sensationalism, Agnosticism and Idealism alike — have, for all that has hitherto been urged in their favour, no more foundation than the supposition that a chimera lives in the moon. It will follow that, unless new reasons never urged hitherto can be found, all the most important philosophic doctrines have as little claim to assent as the most superstitious beliefs of the lowest savages.
Page 130 - The objects here are mental objects. Their relations are perceptually obvious at a glance, and no sense-verification is necessary. Moreover, once true, always true, of those same mental objects. Truth here has an "eternal" character. If you can find a concrete thing anywhere that is "one" or "white" or "gray" or an "effect," then your principles will everlastingly apply to it.
Page 19 - The sensation of blue exists," we are told what is certainly false and self-contradictory. If we are told that the existence of blue is inconceivable apart from the existence of the sensation, the speaker probably means to convey to us, by this ambiguous expression, what is a self-contradictory error. For we can and must conceive the existence of blue as something quite distinct from the existence of the sensation. We can and must conceive that blue might exist and yet the sensation of blue not exist....
Page 320 - Love your enemies, do good to them that hate you, bless them that curse you, pray for them that despitefully use you.
Page 17 - We have then in every sensation two distinct terms, (1) 'consciousness,' in respect of which all sensations are alike; and (2) something else, in respect of which one sensation differs from another. It will be convenient if I may be allowed to call this second term the 'object' of a sensation: this also without yet attempting to say what I mean by the word.
Page 1 - These points are that, whatever be its exact meaning, it is certainly meant to assert (1) that the universe is very different indeed from what it seems, and (2) that it has quite a large number of properties which it does not seem to have.
Page 16 - The principle of organic unities, like that of combined analysis and synthesis, is mainly used to defend the practice of holding both of two contradictory propositions, wherever this may seem convenient. In this, as in other matters, Hegel's main service to philosophy has consisted in giving a name to and erecting into a principle, a type of fallacy to which experience had shown philosophers, along with the rest of mankind, to be addicted. No wonder that he has followers and admirers.