Philosophical Studies

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Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1922 - Philosophy - 342 pages
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Contents

I
1
II
31
III
97
IV
147
V
168
VI
197
VII
220
VIII
253
IX
276
X
310

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Page 130 - Relations among purely mental ideas form another sphere where true and false beliefs obtain, and here the beliefs are absolute, or unconditional. When they are true they bear the name either of definitions or of principles. It is either a principle or a definition that...
Page 108 - I constantly be repeating the truth 'twice two are four' because of its eternal claim on recognition? or is it sometimes irrelevant? Must my thoughts dwell night and day on my personal sins and blemishes, because I truly have them?— or may I sink and ignore them in order to be a decent social unit, and not a mass of morbid melancholy and apology? It is quite evident that our obligation to acknowledge truth, so far from being unconditional, is tremendously conditioned.
Page 228 - This, after all, you know, really is a finger: there is no doubt about it: I know it and you all know it. And I think we may safely challenge any philosopher to bring forward any argument in favour either of the proposition that we do not know it, or of the proposition that it is not true, which does not at some point, rest upon some premiss which is, beyond comparison, less certain than is the proposition which it is designed to attack.
Page 5 - Sensationalism, Agnosticism and Idealism alike — have, for all that has hitherto been urged in their favour, no more foundation than the supposition that a chimera lives in the moon. It will follow that, unless new reasons never urged hitherto can be found, all the most important philosophic doctrines have as little claim to assent as the most superstitious beliefs of the lowest savages.
Page 130 - The objects here are mental objects. Their relations are perceptually obvious at a glance, and no sense-verification is necessary. Moreover, once true, always true, of those same mental objects. Truth here has an "eternal" character. If you can find a concrete thing anywhere that is "one" or "white" or "gray" or an "effect," then your principles will everlastingly apply to it.
Page 19 - The sensation of blue exists," we are told what is certainly false and self-contradictory. If we are told that the existence of blue is inconceivable apart from the existence of the sensation, the speaker probably means to convey to us, by this ambiguous expression, what is a self-contradictory error. For we can and must conceive the existence of blue as something quite distinct from the existence of the sensation. We can and must conceive that blue might exist and yet the sensation of blue not exist....
Page 320 - Love your enemies, do good to them that hate you, bless them that curse you, pray for them that despitefully use you.
Page 17 - We have then in every sensation two distinct terms, (1) 'consciousness,' in respect of which all sensations are alike; and (2) something else, in respect of which one sensation differs from another. It will be convenient if I may be allowed to call this second term the 'object' of a sensation: this also without yet attempting to say what I mean by the word.
Page 1 - These points are that, whatever be its exact meaning, it is certainly meant to assert (1) that the universe is very different indeed from what it seems, and (2) that it has quite a large number of properties which it does not seem to have.
Page 16 - The principle of organic unities, like that of combined analysis and synthesis, is mainly used to defend the practice of holding both of two contradictory propositions, wherever this may seem convenient. In this, as in other matters, Hegel's main service to philosophy has consisted in giving a name to and erecting into a principle, a type of fallacy to which experience had shown philosophers, along with the rest of mankind, to be addicted. No wonder that he has followers and admirers.

About the author (1922)

George Edward Moore was one of the giants in the formation of analytic philosophy in the English-speaking world. During most of his professional life, he was affiliated with Cambridge University---as a student and as a fellow at Trinity College, from 1892 to 1896 and from 1898 to 1904, respectively; as a university lecturer from 1911 to 1925; as a professor of mental philosophy and logic from 1925 until his retirement in 1939. Moore's philosophical contributions touch on three areas: philosophical method, moral philosophy, and theory of knowledge. His philosophical method is exhibited in his unrelenting effort to discover and elucidate the meanings of philosophical concepts and in his appeal to common sense. This method is evident in his work in ethics and epistemology. Principia Ethica (1903) established him as the foremost critic of ethical naturalism; his conceptions of goodness as an indefinable quality and of intrinsic value as organic unity were influential not only in philosophical circles but also among the artists and writers of the Bloomsbury group. Moore's work in epistemology was expressed in a large number of articles distinguished for their nicety of analysis. They span six decades, revealing a thinker who moved out of idealism into realism and then moved back and forth among the varieties of realism on such questions as the status of sense data, that is, whether they exist, and if they exist, whether they are physical parts of things or are mental representations only.

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