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The Domain of Constitutional Political Economy
The Politicization of Market Failure
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Adam Smith agreement alternative analysis argument benefits Buchanan calculus Calculus of Consent chapter choice behavior choose classical liberal conceptually constitutional choice constitutional economics Constitutional Political constraints contractarian cooperative costs criticism David Gauthier deference defined discussion distinction distributional economists embodies emerge epistemic equilibrium ethical evaluation exist externality F. A. Hayek firms G. L. S. Shackle Geoffrey Brennan Gordon Tullock groups Hutt Hutt's ideal implications increasing returns individual input institutional internal interpretation investment involves James John Rawls liberties limits majoritarian modified moral nexus nomics normative numbers observed outcomes Pareto participants parties payoff persons perspective players political economy politicized position potential predicted preferences production public choice rational choice rational ignorance reform regime relevant remains restrictions scientific sense set of rules shift social interaction solution strategy structure suggest theory tion tional tive trade utility function utility maximization voluntary exchanges welfare economics Wicksell Wicksellian