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abstract ideas absurdity action agent appear argument beauty Bishop Berkeley body called cause character Charles Lamb Charles X colour conceive connexion consequence consider consists copy distinct doctrine Dr Priestley E S S A Y effect equally Essay exist external eyes faculty fancy father feeling follow free agent genius give hath Heraldic Visitations Hobbes human imagination impressions innate innate ideas instance J. R. Smith judgment justice knowledge labour Lady Mary Shepherd letter Locke Locke's Maidstone mankind matter means ment merely metaphysical mind moral motion nature necessary never object observe operations opinion original pain particular passion perceived perception person philosophy picture pleasure principle produce question racter reason Salisbury Plain seems sensation sense spirit substance supposed thing thought tion Titian true truth uncon understanding whole WILLIAM HAZLITT words write
Page xxvii - How charming is divine Philosophy! Not harsh and crabbed, as dull fools suppose, But musical as is Apollo's lute, And a perpetual feast of nectar'd sweets, Where no crude surfeit reigns.
Page 166 - ... what opinion he has of his fellow -subjects, when he rides armed; of his fellow -citizens, when he locks his doors; and of his children and servants, when he locks his chests. Does he not there as much accuse mankind by his actions as I do by my words? But neither of us accuse man's nature in it.
Page 236 - The understanding seems to me not to have the least glimmering of any ideas which it doth not receive from one of these two. External objects furnish the mind with the ideas of sensible qualities, which are all those different perceptions they produce in us; and the mind furnishes the understanding with ideas of its own operations.
Page 234 - Let us then suppose the mind to be, as we say, white paper, void of all characters, without any ideas ; how comes it to be furnished ? Whence comes it by that vast store which the busy and boundless fancy of man has painted on it with an almost endless variety? Whence has it all the materials of reason and knowledge ? To this I answer in one word, from experience ; in that all our knowledge is founded, and from that it ultimately derives itself.
Page 236 - These two, I say, viz., external material things as the objects of sensation, and the operations of our own minds within as the objects of reflection, are, to me, the only originals from whence all our ideas take their beginnings.
Page 292 - The table I write on I say exists, that is I see and feel it, and if I were out of my study I should say it existed, meaning thereby that if I was in my study I might perceive it, or that some other spirit actually does perceive it.
Page 237 - For methinks the understanding is not much unlike a closet wholly shut from light, with only some little opening left to let in external visible resemblances or ideas of things without: would the pictures coming into such a dark room but stay there, and lie so orderly as to be found upon occasion, it would very much resemble the understanding of a man in reference to all objects of sight, and the ideas of them.
Page 142 - From desire ariseth the thought of some means we have seen produce the like of that which we aim at; and from the thought of that, the thought of means to that mean; and so continually till we come to some beginning within our own power.
Page 133 - THAT when a thing lies still, unless somewhat else stir it, it will lie still for ever, is a truth that no man doubts of. But that when- a thing is in motion, it will eternally be in motion, unless somewhat else stay it, though the reason be the same, namely, imagination, that nothing can change itself, is not so easily assented to.