Clinical Ethics: Due Care and the Principle of Nonmaleficence

Front Cover
University Press of America, 2001 - Medical - 181 pages
In Clinical Ethics, Robert Timko argues that the moral dilemmas of clinical medical practice can best be resolved within a framework of prima facie duties, and that the most stringent duty is that of nonmaleficence. Timko shows that respect for individual autonomy and the principle of beneficence are inadequate for the moral practice of medicine since simple adherence to either principle may be insufficient for the provision of 'due care.' Clinical health care practitioners should know and understand their clients' perceptions of illness and suffering and their life-plans and values if they wish to avoid bringing further harm to their clients. Additionally, Timko argues that the prevention of harm is best served and 'due care' best provided if the clinical relationship is defined within the framework of a covenantal agreement between health-care practitioners and the moral community. Intrinsic to his argument is the belief that it is not only permissible to limit a client's autonomy, but that is sometimes obligatory to do so. In terms of a community's overall good, paternalistic interventions appear to be justifiable and sometimes necessary. Finally, Joan Hoff provides an insightful commentary on the logic of a communitarian ethic as the foundation for a just health-care system and the understanding of virtue and responsibility in health-care practice.
 

Contents

Overview
1
Some First Considerations
2
The Nature of Prima Facie Duties
5
The Nature of a Moral Community
8
Harm and the Moral Community
10
Other Duties Which May Arise
12
Some Considerations in Playing Moral Geographer
13
The Duty of Mutuality
14
Conclusion
87
The Question of Informed Consent
89
The Conditions of an Informed Consent
92
Comprehension
94
Voluntariness
96
Competency
97
Specific Competency
98
Legal vs Moral Requirements of Consent
99

Patient Perceptions and Models for the Therapeutic Relationship
15
A First Look at the Questions of Autonomy and Paternalism
17
Autonomy and Informed Consent
19
Constraints on the Autonomy of the HealthCare Practitioner
22
The Question of Beneficence
24
Some Preliminary Conclusions
25
Perceptions of Illness and Suffering
27
The Self as a Lived Body
30
Illness Community and Social Practice
31
The Concept of Suffering
33
Proper Practice in the Sick Role
36
Conclusions
38
Models for the Clinical Relationship
41
The Question of Models in General
42
Veatch and Models
44
The Collegial Model
52
Contracts and Covenants
53
Additionally a covenantal relationship
55
Virtue and the Clinical Relationship
56
Virtues and the Question of a Clinical Relationship as a Practice
58
Conclusions
59
The Questions of Autonomy and Autonomous Choice
61
What are Autonomous Actions?
64
Understanding
66
Noncontrol
68
The Nature of and Kinds of Manipulations
70
Autonomy as Mastery of Ones Life
73
Can Parentalism be Justified?
76
A Further Reflection on Communities Autonomy Parentalism and Duty
79
Perceptions of Illness and Autonomy
85
Conclusion
102
Refusal and the Duty of Informed Choice
105
The Case of Dax Cowart
106
The Duty to be Informed
108
A Final Argument
112
The Principle of Beneficence
115
A First Look at Beneficence
116
Response to Need
118
Mutual Aid
120
Some Limits to Beneficence
121
Beneficence or Nonmaleficence
123
Beneficence and WellBeing
125
The Question of Respect
127
Another Look at Beneficence
128
Conclusions
130
The Principle of Nonmaleficence
133
Due Care
134
Harms and Detriments
135
A Final Criticism and Defense of Nonmaleficence
137
Conclusions and Proposals
141
The Role of Justice in Determining the Boundaries of Health Care
142
The Role of the Virtuous Physician
150
The Role of the Virtuous Patient
154
The Assumption of Responsibilities in Healthcare
156
Health Care as a Common Good
161
BIBLIOGRAPHY
171
INDEX
177
About the Authors
Copyright

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About the author (2001)

Robert M. Timko is Professor of Philosophy and Liberal Studies at Mansfield University, and is former President of the American Association of Philosophy Teachers.

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