Ordered Anarchy: Jasay and His Surroundings
Hardy Bouillon, Hartmut Kliemt
Ashgate Publishing, Ltd., Jan 1, 2007 - Philosophy - 198 pages
Anthony de Jasay's work has been enormously influential, describing both a theoretical philosophical model for a stateless, liberal, free market order and offering analysis of and solutions to many of the technical economic problems associated with such a vision of society - most notably his work on the free rider and his return. In this book ten significant scholars in philosophy and political economy, including Nobel laureate in economics James Buchanan, pay tribute to the man and his work in a series of essays at once both respectful and critical.
Ordered Anarchy focuses on three fundamental questions of libertarian thinking. Which are the basic libertarian principles and how do rights and liberties relate to each other? Is order possible and durable in an anarchic or quasi-anarchic society, and it so, under which preconditions? How and to what extent are the pillars of politics, such as the constitution, institutions and government, detrimental or beneficial to an enduring free society?
While Narveson, Palmer and Bouillon focus on the first of these questions, the late Radnitzky and van Dun address the second. Benson, Holcombe and Kliemt provide answers to question number three, while Buchanan and Little highlight the role of Anthony de Jasay in this debate and the inspiration that his thinking has given to the authors of this volume.
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actions advantage agreement Anarchy Anthony de Jasay argument Arneson Austrian Economics bargaining behavior beliefs benefits Benson Buchanan Cambridge choice citizens claim classical liberal conflict Congleton consensus constitutional Contractarian convivial order cooperation costs create David Gauthier democratic difference principle dilemma distribution equal Evolution example existence exit externalities extortionist F. A. Hayek force freedom Geoffrey Brennan Gordon Tullock Hayek Hobbes Hobbesian Holcombe human Ibid incentives individuals inequalities instance institutions interaction interests Jasay's Journal of Law Law and Economics libertarian liberty limited moral natural law nomocracy norms notes Nozick obligations option organization Oxford person philosophy political position predators principle of fairness problem production property rights protection Radnitzky rational rationale for government Rawls Rawls's Rawlsian reason redistribution rent-seeking Robert Nozick ruler rules scarcity social contract social contract theory social order society solution Theory of Justice threats Tullock University Press Vanberg voluntary wealth York