Law and EconomicsThis best-selling text continues to provide studentswith a clear method for applying economic analysis to the study of legal rules and institutions. Following an overview of the tools of economic analysis for law students and the tools of legal analysis for economics students, uniquely paired chapters offer a combination of clear theoretical analysis followed by practical application. Economic theories in four core areas of the law are used to explain and analyze topics, illustrating how microeconomic theory can be used to increase understanding of the law and improve public policy. The Third Edition has been thoroughly revised, improving the clarity and flow in exposition, as well as updating the data and examples. *Added examples and cases help to further clarify economic applications. *Unique two-chapter sequences set up the economic model in the first chapter, and then apply the model in the second chapter. *Four key areas of the law are covered: property, contracts, torts, and crime and punishment. *Cases from previous editions and other materials will be posted on the Web. *Learning Aids: Questions, Boxed Inserts, Chapter-End References, Extensive Footnotes, Answers to questi |
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Page 29
... zero . " 10 This leads to the conclusion that economic profits are zero in an industry that is in long - run equilibrium . Because this condition can occur only at the minimum point of the firm's average cost curve , where the average ...
... zero . " 10 This leads to the conclusion that economic profits are zero in an industry that is in long - run equilibrium . Because this condition can occur only at the minimum point of the firm's average cost curve , where the average ...
Page 191
... zero . If the cost of cooperating equals zero , then the payoff of cooperation equals .5 for the first player and .5 for the second player , as in Figure 6.1 . Now consider the possibility that the cost of cooperating equals 1.5 . If ...
... zero . If the cost of cooperating equals zero , then the payoff of cooperation equals .5 for the first player and .5 for the second player , as in Figure 6.1 . Now consider the possibility that the cost of cooperating equals 1.5 . If ...
Page 192
... zero . When cooperating costs 1.5 , it would be more efficient to appro- priate than to cooperate . Efficiency requires the second player to cooperate when it costs zero , whereas efficiency requires the second player to appropriate ...
... zero . When cooperating costs 1.5 , it would be more efficient to appro- priate than to cooperate . Efficiency requires the second player to cooperate when it costs zero , whereas efficiency requires the second player to appropriate ...
Contents
AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW | 3 |
A REVIEW OF MICROECONOMIC THEORY | 9 |
TOPICS IN THE ECONOMICS OF CRIME | 12 |
Copyright | |
15 other sections not shown
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accident allocation amount assume award bargain theory benefit breach buyer cause chapter Coase theorem common law comparative negligence compensatory damages Consequently consumers contract law cooperation court crime criminal curve defendant disputes economic theory economists efficiency requires enforce equals error example exchange expected monetary value expected value explained external facts farmer Figure filing game theory harm illustrate incentives income increase indifference curve injurer injurer's investment judge lawyers legal standard litigation loss marginal cost maximize negligence rule optimal owner ownership Pareto efficiency parties patent payoff perfect expectation damages performance plaintiff probability production profits promise promisor property law property rights punishment QUESTION rancher rational relationship reliance remedy risk rule of strict second player seller settlement social costs strict liability Suppose surplus threat value tion tort law tort liability transaction costs trial United utility victim whereas zero