Punitive Damages: How Juries DecideOver the past two decades, the United States has seen a dramatic increase in the number and magnitude of punitive damages verdicts rendered by juries in civil trials. Probably the most extraordinary example is the July 2000 award of $144.8 billion in the Florida class action lawsuit brought against cigarette manufacturers. Or consider two recent verdicts against the auto manufacturer BMW in Alabama. In identical cases, argued in the same court before the same judge, one jury awarded $4 million in punitive damages, while the other awarded no punitive damages at all. In cases involving accidents, civil rights, and the environment, multimillion-dollar punitive awards have been a subject of intense controversy. But how do juries actually make decisions about punitive damages? To find out, the authors-experts in psychology, economics, and the law-present the results of controlled experiments with more than 600 mock juries involving the responses of more than 8,000 jury-eligible citizens. Although juries tended to agree in their moral judgments about the defendant's conduct, they rendered erratic and unpredictable dollar awards. The experiments also showed that instead of moderating juror verdicts, the process of jury deliberation produced a striking "severity shift" toward ever-higher awards. Jurors also tended to ignore instructions from the judges; were influenced by whatever amount the plaintiff happened to request; showed "hindsight bias," believing that what happened should have been foreseen; and penalized corporations that had based their decisions on careful cost-benefit analyses. While judges made many of the same errors, they performed better in some areas, suggesting that judges (or other specialists) may be better equipped than juries to decide punitive damages. Using a wealth of new experimental data, and offering a host of provocative findings, this book documents a wide range of systematic biases in jury behavior. It will be indispensable for anyone interested not only in punitive damages, but also jury behavior, psychology, and how people think about punishment. |
From inside the book
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... Hindsight Effects on Judgments of Liability for Punitive Damages,” 23(5) Law and Human Behavior 597 (1999). W. Kip Viscusi, “Corporate Risk Analysis: A Reckless Act?” 52(3) Stanford Law Review 547 (2000). Cass R. Sunstein, David A ...
... Hindsight Effects on Judgments of Liability for Punitive Damages,” 23(5) Law and Human Behavior 597 (1999). W. Kip Viscusi, “Corporate Risk Analysis: A Reckless Act?” 52(3) Stanford Law Review 547 (2000). Cass R. Sunstein, David A ...
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... effect of hindsight on the assessment of risk . Still other studies probe jurors ' attitudes toward the notion of optimal deterrence , which is often recommended as a basis for setting punitive damages awards . 16. Because the ...
... effect of hindsight on the assessment of risk . Still other studies probe jurors ' attitudes toward the notion of optimal deterrence , which is often recommended as a basis for setting punitive damages awards . 16. Because the ...
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Contents
| 1 | |
| 17 | |
How Juries Think | 27 |
Conclusions | 209 |
Judges Instructions | 259 |
Glossary | 261 |
Bibliography | 267 |
List of Contributors | 277 |
Index | 279 |
Other editions - View all
Punitive Damages: How Juries Decide Cass R. Sunstein,Reid Hastie,John W. Payne,David A. Schkade,W. Kip Viscusi No preview available - 2003 |
Common terms and phrases
$10 million accident Amos Tversky anchoring effects asked assessed average award punitive damages behavior biases chapter chemicals compensatory damages context corporate cost cost-benefit analysis courts danger or risk Daniel Kahneman defendant deliberating juries deterrence theory deterrence value dollar awards dollar verdicts ex ante Experiment experimental findings harm higher hindsight bias hindsight effects inffuence Jardel judge’s judge's instructions judges judgments jury instructions jury verdict jury-eligible citizens Kip Viscusi liability for punitive median award ment mock juries mock jurors negligence nitive damages NTSB optimal deterrence outrage overall participants Paul Slovic penalty personal injury plaintiff Polinsky-Shavell predeliberation predictable probability of detection punishment value punitive awards punitive dam punitive damages amount punitive damages awards punitive damages decisions punitive damages verdict question railroad reckless Reid Hastie respondents risk analysis risk beliefs safety sample scale scenario Schkade Shavell significant statistical survey tions Tort trial variability