Fighting to the End: The Pakistan Army's Way of War

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Oxford University Press, 2014 - Political Science - 347 pages
Since Pakistan was founded in 1947, its army has dominated the state. The military establishment has locked the country in an enduring rivalry with India, with the primary aim of wresting Kashmir from it. To that end, Pakistan initiated three wars over Kashmir-in 1947, 1965, and 1999-and failed to win any of them. Today, the army continues to prosecute this dangerous policy by employing non-state actors under the security of its ever-expanding nuclear umbrella. It has sustained a proxy war in Kashmir since 1989 using Islamist militants, as well as supporting non-Islamist insurgencies throughout India and a country-wide Islamist terror campaign that have brought the two countries to the brink of war on several occasions. In addition to these territorial revisionist goals, the Pakistani army has committed itself to resisting India's slow but inevitable rise on the global stage.

Despite Pakistan's efforts to coerce India, it has achieved only modest successes at best. Even though India vivisected Pakistan in 1971, Pakistan continues to see itself as India's equal and demands the world do the same. The dangerous methods that the army uses to enforce this self-perception have brought international opprobrium upon Pakistan and its army. And in recent years, their erstwhile proxies have turned their guns on the Pakistani state itself.

Why does the army persist in pursuing these revisionist policies that have come to imperil the very viability of the state itself, from which the army feeds? In Fighting to the End, C. Christine Fair argues that the answer lies, at least partially, in the strategic culture of the army. Through an unprecedented analysis of decades' worth of the army's own defense publications, she concludes that from the army's distorted view of history, it is victorious as long as it can resist India's purported drive for regional hegemony as well as the territorial status quo. Simply put, acquiescence means defeat. Fighting to the End convincingly shows that because the army is unlikely to abandon these preferences, Pakistan will remain a destabilizing force in world politics for the foreseeable future.

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This book have lots of things that aren't even true. The author needs to straighten her facts. She got it all wrong and don't even know a thing about Pakistan or any of the wars we fought with india. She has an agenda which is US and India to invade Pakistan and she have said it multiple times on multiple platforms and she is just spreading that agenda by her book. I'm really disappointed.  

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Minority population has been reduced from 27% to 0.5% ?? I find this "impossible" to believe if it is being said that such a reduction happened "post independence" and doesn't include a "large" minority hindu population that once resided in what was known as East Pakistan.

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Chapter 1 Introduction to the Pakistan Armys Way of War
Chapter 2 Can Strategic Culture Explain the Pakistan Armys Persistent Revisionism?
Chapter 3 Born an Insecure State
Chapter 4 The Armys Defense of Pakistans Ideological Frontiers
Chapter 5 Pakistans Quest for Strategic Depth
Chapter 6 India under the Pakistan Armys Gaze
Chapter 7 Seeking Security through Alliances
Chapter 8 Seeking Security under a Nuclear Umbrella
Chapter 9 Jihad under the Nuclear Umbrella
Chapter 10 Is the Past Prologue?
Chapter 11 The Armys Strategic Culture and Implications for International Security

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About the author (2014)

C. Christine Fair is an Assistant Professor in the Security Studies Program within Georgetown University's Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service. She previously served as a senior political scientist with the RAND Corporation, a political officer with the United Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan in Kabul, and a senior research associate in the Center for Conflict Analysis and Prevention at the United States Institute of Peace.

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