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abandon ship Albert Gleaves Am-Cargo Am-Passenger American Antilles armored cruisers Army Trans Army Transport Service arrived Atlantic attack Azores Battleship boat boilers Brest British Captain Comdr convoy Covington Cruiser and Transport damage Date Placed deck depth bombs destroyers duty enemy submarine engine room escort Europe Total Number Ex-Ger'n Cargo Ex-German explosion feet Finland fire room Fleet July France French George Washington German Gleaves Guacanayabo Bay gun crews Henderson June knots Lenape Leviathan Lieutenant Commander lookout Luckenbach maneuver marine miles morning Mount Vernon Naval Transport night operating passengers periscope port President Lincoln rafts Remy repairs reported Returned to Fleet Rijndam sailed Seattle Service Sept ship's Shipping Board Sept side sighted Signing of Armistice soldiers speed starboard steamer Steuben subma submarine submerged sunk survivors tion tonnage tons torpedo Transport Force Troop Carrying troop transports troopships U-boat U. S. Navy United valve vessels voyage yards York zigzagging
Page 26 - States ships, and all but 2^2 per cent. of these sailed in United States naval transports. All the troops carried in United States ships were escorted by United States men-of-war; that is, cruisers, destroyers, converted yachts, and other anti-submarine craft. Also for the most part the troops carried in British, French, and Italian ships were given safe conduct through the danger zones by United States destroyers. Roughly, 82 ^ per cent.
Page 28 - Previous to 1916 the idea of a United States overseas expeditionary force numbered by millions would have been generally regarded as a remote if not impossible contingency. Consequently no extensive peace-time preparations had been made for such an undertaking. The task of providing a transport fleet was, therefore, a pioneer work. Ships had to be obtained, officers and crews enrolled and trained. It was necessary to provide docks, storehouses, lighters and tugs, coaling equipment, repair facilities,...
Page 33 - The somewhat motley assemblage of ships finally gathered together for the first expedition did not long survive the duty imposed upon them. Some were torpedoed, others relegated to carry cargo and cattle, and some were subsequently wrecked or dropped out altogether because of unseaworthiness. Looking back to the first expedition of June 1917, it seems indeed that the hand of Providence must have been held over these 'arks' or the task never could have been accomplished.
Page 284 - THIS BOOK IS DUE ON THE LAST DATE STAMPED BELOW AN INITIAL FINE OF 25 CENTS WILL BE ASSESSED FOR FAILURE TO RETURN THIS BOOK ON THE DATE DUE. THE PENALTY WILL INCREASE TO SO CENTS ON THE FOURTH DAY AND TO SI OO ON THE SEVENTH DAY OVERDUE.
Page 30 - ... for repairs. The United States armored cruiser San Diego struck a mine laid by a German submarine and was sunk. The service was not without hazard, as is shown by the fact that more than half of the war casualties in the United States Navy were suffered in the Cruiser and Transport Force. Nor were enemy guns and torpedoes the only menace — danger from fire and internal damage was enhanced by the machinations of enemy secret agents, and the likelihood of collision was increased by the necessity...
Page 30 - ... fortunate. In a measure this has been due to need of concentrating maximum naval escort protection on troopladen convoys. Frequently this necessitated lighter escort for the ships returning, and it was on these homewardbound vessels that the submarines scored their successes. The United States Naval Transports Antilles, President Lincoln, and Covington were torpedoed and sunk. The Finland and Mount Vernon were torpedoed, but were able to reach port for repairs. The United States armored cruiser...
Page 273 - ... decisive moment from the use of the weapon which will bring us victory. At any rate it will be expedient to consider what influence the entrance of America into the war on the side of our adversaries would have upon the trend of the war. As regards tonnage, this influence would be very negligible. It is not to be expected that more than a small fraction of the tonnage of the Central Powers lying in America and many other neutral harbors could then be enlisted for the traffic to England. For the...
Page 152 - Of unnamed heroes in the ships— of waves spreading and spreading far as the eye can reach, Of dashing spray, and the winds piping and blowing, And out of these a chant for the sailors of all nations, Fitful, like a surge. Of sea-captains young or old, and the mates, and of all intrepid sailors, Of the few, very choice, taciturn, whom fate can never surprise nor death dismay...
Page 26 - Roughly, 82^ per cent. of the maximum strength of the naval escorts provided incident to the transportation of United States troops across the Atlantic was supplied by the United States Navy, 14^ per cent. by the British Navy, and 3^ per cent. by the French Navy.
Page 22 - I also make out that if the allied shipbuilding firms of the world put forward their full strength as at present, they could not produce more than four million tons of new shipping, in other words about one-half. I am also distressed at the fact that it appears to me to be impossible to provide enough ships to bring the American Army over in hundreds of thousands to France, and, after they are brought over, to supply the enormous amount of shipping which will be required to keep them full up with...