Applying Rationalist Institutionalism to the Iraq Case
GRIN Verlag, 2007 - 28 pages
Seminar paper from the year 2004 in the subject Politics - International Politics - Topic: Peace and Conflict Studies, Security, grade: 2,3, University of Tubingen (Institute of Political Science), course: Seminar: Introduction to International Relations, 13 entries in the bibliography, language: English, abstract: "The basic problem facing anyone trying to understand contempory world politics is that there is so much material to look at that it is difficult to know which things matter and which do not. Where on earth would you start if you wanted to explain the most important political processes? Whenever individuals are faced with such a problem they have to resort to theories, whether they are aware of them or not. A theory is not simply some grand formal model with hypotheses and assumptions; rather a theory is some kind of simplifying device that allows us to decide which facts matter and which do not." (Baylis, Smith 1997: 3) The aim of this paper is to explain the outbreak of the Iraq War in 2003 with the help of a theory called Rationalist Institutionalism, which is one school of thought in International Relations. Firstly, the paper will explain the Iraq Case more closer: what is the object of contention, which is the dependent variable, who are the relevant actors and finally how the course of conflict and the conflict management looked like before the war in 2003 broke out and during the war. Secondly, the paper will introduce Rationalist Institutionalism as one school of thought of International Relations. The paper will look at relevant structures and actors in Rationalist Institutionalism and furthermore present main hypotheses and causal mechanisms followed by the relevant variables within this theory. Thirdly, and the most interesting part, this paper will apply Rationalist Institutionalism to the Iraq Case. Finally the paper will discuss weaknesses and strengths of the theory as well as the question of what additional offers the theory can presen
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Actors in Rationalist Æ Æ Æ lated American Presidents Applying Rationalist Institutionalism Baczewski Applying rationalist Belarus causal mechanism Claudia Baczewski Applying coalition partners complex interdependence conflict parties constellation coop cooperation and peaceful cooperation is highest coordination and collaboration/dilemma cost-benefit calculations degree of institutionalization dependent variable Destruction Control Regime different preferences explain the Iraq game theories games and lowest GRIN Verlag high institutionalization higher the likelihood highest in assurance Hypotheses and Causal institutionalized the international International Relations international system Iraq War Iraq’s Keohane Kuwait likelihood of cooperation low institutionalization lower in coordination lowest in rambo/suasion main hypotheses Mass Destruction Control mistrust non-coop Non-cooperation means Nuclear Weapons object of contention paper peaceful conflict management preferences did collide Prior problematic social structure Rambo Game rambo/suasion games Relevant Actors Republic Saddam Hussein Somalia step from non-cooperation Ukraine United Kingdom Unregu UNSCOM USA and Iraq USA cooperated violent conflict management Weapons of Mass WMDs Zürn
Page 7 - persistent and connected sets of rules, formal and informal, that prescribe behavioral roles, constrain activity, and shape expectations
Page 7 - sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision making procedures around which actors' expectations converge in a given area of international relations.
Page 7 - ... communist guerrilla activities throughout the country's history. 2. Keohane (1989: 4, 6) discusses three measures of institutionalization: (1) commonality, the degree to which expectations about appropriate behavior and understandings about how to interpret actions are shared by system participants; (2) specificity, the degree to which these expectations are clearly specified in the form of rules; and (3) autonomy, the extent to which the institution can promulgate or alter its own rules rather...
Page 6 - The second condition ... is that variation in the degree of institutionalization exert substantial effects on state behavior.
Page 3 - Introduction ,,The basic problem facing anyone trying to understand contempory world politics is that there is so much material to look at that it is difficult to know which things matter and which do not.
Page 16 - O.: lnternational lnstitutions and State Power, Essays in lnternational Relations Theory, Boulder, CO.