Strategies and Games: Theory and Practice

Front Cover
MIT Press, 1999 - Mathematics - 476 pages
6 Reviews

Game theory has become increasingly popular among undergraduate as well as business school students. This text is the first to provide both a complete theoretical treatment of the subject and a variety of real-world applications, primarily in economics, but also in business, political science, and the law. Strategies and Games grew out of Prajit Dutta's experience teaching a course in game theory over the last six years at Columbia University.The book is divided into three parts: Strategic Form Games and Their Applications, Extensive Form Games and Their Applications, and Asymmetric Information Games and Their Applications. The theoretical topics include dominance solutions, Nash equilibrium, backward induction, subgame perfect equilibrium, repeated games, dynamic games, Bayes-Nash equilibrium, mechanism design, auction theory, and signaling. An appendix presents a thorough discussion of single-agent decision theory, as well as the optimization and probability theory required for the course.Every chapter that introduces a new theoretical concept opens with examples and ends with a case study. Case studies include Global Warming and the Internet, Poison Pills, Treasury Bill Auctions, and Final Jeopardy. Each part of the book also contains several chapter-length applications including Bankruptcy Law, the NASDAQ market, OPEC, and the Commons problem. This is also the first text to provide a detailed analysis of dynamic strategic interaction.

 

What people are saying - Write a review

User ratings

5 stars
5
4 stars
1
3 stars
0
2 stars
0
1 star
0

User Review - Flag as inappropriate

Great book so far. Although page 9 is missing.

Contents

A FIRST LOOK AT THE APPLICATIONS
3
A FIRST LOOK AT THE THEORY
17
THEORY AND PRACTICE
33
STRATEGIC FORM GAMES AND DOMINANT STRATEGIES
35
DOMINANCE SOLVABILITY
49
DOMINANCE SOLVABILITY
51
NASH EQUILIBRIUM
63
COURNOT DUOPOLY
75
INFINITELY REPEATED GAMES
227
COMPETITION AND COLLUSION IN THE NASDAQ STOCK MARKET
243
OPEC
257
DYNAMIC GAMES WITH AN APPLICATION TO THE COMMONS PROBLEM
275
THEORY AND APPLICATIONS
291
MORAL HAZARD AND INCENTIVES THEORY
293
GAMES WITH INCOMPLETE INFORMATION
309
IN A COURNOT DUOPOLY
331

THE COMMONS PROBLEM
91
MIXED STRATEGIES
103
NATURAL MONOPOLY AND BANKRUPTCY LAW
121
ZEROSUM GAMES
139
THEORY AND APPLICATIONS
155
EXTENSIVE FORM GAMES AND BACKWARD INDUCTION
157
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
179
SUBGAME PERFECT EQUILIBRIUM
193
FINITELY REPEATED GAMES
209
TO AN UNKNOWN BUYER
349
Auctions
367
Signaling Games and the Lemons Problem
383
CALCULUS AND OPTIMIZATION
403
PROBABILITY AND EXPECTATION
421
UTILITY AND EXPECTED UTILITY
433
EXISTENCE OF NASH EQUILIBRIA
451
INDEX
465
Copyright

Common terms and phrases

References to this book

All Book Search results »

About the author (1999)

Dutta is Professor of Economics at Columbia University.

Bibliographic information