A Treatise of Human Nature: Being an Attempt to Introduce the Experimental Method of Reasoning Into Moral Subjects ; And, Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, Volume 1

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Longmans, Green, and Company, 1890 - Knowledge, Theory of - 1037 pages

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It assumes that simple ideas are consciously referred to things
Reasons why its testimony must be trusted
Such restriction if maintained would render the testimony
This invented relation forms the very being of things
Only to nominal essences that general propositions relate i e only
Ground of distinction between actual sensation and ideas in
How Locke mixes up these two meanings in ambiguity about
Fatal to the notion that mathematical truths though general
mind and body as a nominal essence ce
These as knowable must be our ideas and therefore not a real
Why they do not trouble him more
Ambiguity as to real essence causes like ambiguity as to science
Two lines of thought in Locke between which a follower would
Matter and mind have the same source in selfconsciousness
An act finite in its nature remains so however often repeated
Lockes proof of the real existence of
The world which is to prove an eternal God must be itself
Two ways of dealing with it Berkeley chooses the most
For Lockes idea of a thing he substitutes idea simply
Berkeley disposes of space for fear of limiting God
He supposes a divine decree that one feeling shall follow another
His inference to God from necessity of a power to produce ideas
Are there general ideas ? Berkeley said yes and no
His account of these
Substancescollections of ideas
Hume nosimply
The question how the singular proposition is possible the vital
In order to seem to do so he must get rid of Infinite Divisi
True rationale of Lockes doctrine
The admission that no relations of quantity are data of sense

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Page 170 - For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble on some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never can catch myself 'at any time without a perception, and never can observe anything but the perception.
Page 311 - I comprehend all our sensations, passions, and emotions, as they make their first appearance in the soul. By ideas I mean the faint images of these in thinking and reasoning...
Page 544 - When I look abroad, I foresee on every side, dispute, contradiction, anger, calumny and detraction. When I turn my eye inward, I find nothing but doubt and ignorance. All the world conspires to oppose and contradict me; tho...
Page 474 - Nature, by an absolute and uncontroulable necessity has determin'd us to judge as well as to breathe and feel; nor can we any more forbear viewing certain objects in a stronger and fuller light, upon account of their customary...
Page 33 - ... ideas are general when they are set up as the representatives of many particular things : but universality belongs not to things themselves, which are all of them particular in their existence, even those words and ideas which in their signification are general.
Page 34 - When therefore we quit particulars, the generals that rest are only creatures of our own making, their general nature being nothing but the capacity they are put into by the understanding of signifying or representing many particulars. For the signification they have is nothing but a relation that by the mind of man is added to them.
Page 371 - Let us fix our attention out of ourselves as much as possible ; let us chase our imagination to the heavens, or to the utmost limits of the universe : we never really advance a step beyond ourselves, nor can conceive any kind of existence but those perceptions which have appeared in that narrow compass.
Page 64 - Words become general by being made the signs of general ideas; and ideas become general by separating from them the circumstances of time and place and any other ideas that may determine them to this or that particular existence. By this way of abstraction they are made capable of representing more individuals than one: each of which, having in it a conformity to that abstract idea, is (as we call it) of that sort.
Page 534 - The mind is a kind of theatre, where several perceptions successively make their appearance ; pass, repass, glide away, and mingle in an infinite variety of postures and situations.
Page 44 - It is evident the mind knows not things immediately, but only by the intervention of the ideas it has of them. Our knowledge, therefore, is real only so far as there is a conformity between our ideas and the reality of things.

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