A Treatise of Human Nature: Being an Attempt to Introduce the Experimental Method of Reasoning Into Moral Subjects ; And, Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, Volume 1

David Hume

Longmans, Green, and Company, 1890 - Knowledge, Theory of - 1037 pages

Contents

• If they imply permanent relations his theory properly excludes: 1
• Is such observation possible?: 6
• The simple idea as Locke describes it is a complex idea: 12
• Only as such can it be named: 15
• guished: 19
• Made for not by us and therefore according to Locke really: 22
• But it is explicitly to substance that Locke makes them refer: 31
• Correlativity of cause and substance: 43
• Reasons why its testimony must be trusted: 47
• Such restriction if maintained would render the testimony: 53
• There must have been something from eternity to cause what: 54
• This invented relation forms the very being of things: 59
• Only to nominal essences that general propositions relate i e only: 65
• Ground of distinction between actual sensation and ideas in: 71
• Hence another view of real essence as unknown qualities of: 75
• How can primary qualities be outside consciousness and: 81
• Only about qualities of matter as distinct from matter itself that: 88
• Why they do not trouble him more: 94
• Fatal to the notion that mathematical truths though general: 100
• Two lines of thought in Locke between which a follower would: 106
• Two ways out of such difficulties: 112
• The world which is to prove an eternal God must be itself: 114
• Can it be applied to him figuratively in virtue of the indefi: 118
• Sense in which the self is truly real: 124
• Yes according to the true notion of the relation between thought: 130
• His account of the relation between visible and tangible: 136
• Which if ideafeeling does away with space and body: 142
• well as to a true Theism: 158
• Physiology wont answer the question that Locke asked: 164
• His account of these: 171
• Are there general ideas? Berkeley said yes and no: 176
• Substancescollections of ideas: 177
• As to the subject he equivocates between singleness of feeling: 182
• His criticisms of the doctrine of primary qualities: 189
• The parts of space are parts of a perception: 195
• The thing will have ceased before the quality begins to be: 201
• A compound impression excluded by Humes doctrine: 204
• In his account of the idea as abstract Hume really introduces: 211
• Identity of objects an unavoidable crux for Hume: 212
• Idea of time even more unaccountable on Humes principles: 217
• Quantity made up of impressions and there must be a least: 224
• What becomes of the exactness of mathematics according: 230
• With Hume idea of vacuum impossible but logically not more: 236
• Relation of cause and effect the same as this transition: 242
• Nor determined by any objective relation: 248
• Comparison of present experience with past which yields rela: 264
• Hume evades this question still he is a long way off the Induc: 272
• Philosophical relation consists in a comparison but no compari: 294
• INTRODUCTION TO TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE: 305
• BOOK I: 311
• Of the Ideas of the Memory and Imagination: 317
• Of Abstract Ideas: 325
• PART II: 334
• Of the other Qualities of our Ideas of Space and Time: 340
• SECT PAGE V The same subject continud: 358
• Of the Idea of Existence and of External Existence: 369
• PART III: 372
• Of Probability and of the Idea of Cause and Effect: 375
• Why a Cause is always Necessary: 380
• Of the Component Parts of our Reasonings Concerning Cause and Effect: 384
• Of the Impressions of the Senses and Memory: 385
• Of the Inference from the Impression to the Idea: 388
• Of the Nature of the Idea or Belief: 394
• Of the Causes of Belief: 399
• Of the Effects of other Relations and other Habits: 406
• Of the Influence of Belief: 416
• Of the Probability of Chances: 423
• Of the Probability of Causes: 428
• Of Unphilosophical Probability: 439
• Of the Idea of Necessary Connexion: 450
• Rules by which to judge of Causes and Effects: 466
• Of the Reason of Animals: 469
• PART IV: 472
• Of Scepticism with regard to the Senses: 478
• The comparison is between present and past experience of suc: 483
• Of the Antient Philosophy: 505
• Of the Modern Philosophy: 510
• V Of the Immateriality of the Soul: 516
• WI Of Personal Identity: 533
• Significance of this doctrine 98: 543
• Conclusion of this Book: 544
• APPENDIX: 555
• INDEX: 561

Popular passages

Page 170 - For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble on some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never can catch myself 'at any time without a perception, and never can observe anything but the perception.

Page 311 - I comprehend all our sensations, passions, and emotions, as they make their first appearance in the soul. By ideas I mean the faint images of these in thinking and reasoning...

Page 544 - When I look abroad, I foresee on every side, dispute, contradiction, anger, calumny and detraction. When I turn my eye inward, I find nothing but doubt and ignorance. All the world conspires to oppose and contradict me; tho...

Page 474 - Nature, by an absolute and uncontroulable necessity has determin'd us to judge as well as to breathe and feel; nor can we any more forbear viewing certain objects in a stronger and fuller light, upon account of their customary...

Page 33 - ... ideas are general when they are set up as the representatives of many particular things : but universality belongs not to things themselves, which are all of them particular in their existence, even those words and ideas which in their signification are general.

Page 34 - When therefore we quit particulars, the generals that rest are only creatures of our own making, their general nature being nothing but the capacity they are put into by the understanding of signifying or representing many particulars. For the signification they have is nothing but a relation that by the mind of man is added to them.

Page 371 - Let us fix our attention out of ourselves as much as possible ; let us chase our imagination to the heavens, or to the utmost limits of the universe : we never really advance a step beyond ourselves, nor can conceive any kind of existence but those perceptions which have appeared in that narrow compass.

Page 64 - Words become general by being made the signs of general ideas; and ideas become general by separating from them the circumstances of time and place and any other ideas that may determine them to this or that particular existence. By this way of abstraction they are made capable of representing more individuals than one: each of which, having in it a conformity to that abstract idea, is (as we call it) of that sort.

Page 534 - The mind is a kind of theatre, where several perceptions successively make their appearance ; pass, repass, glide away, and mingle in an infinite variety of postures and situations.

Page 44 - It is evident the mind knows not things immediately, but only by the intervention of the ideas it has of them. Our knowledge, therefore, is real only so far as there is a conformity between our ideas and the reality of things.

Bibliographic information

• Title: A Treatise of Human Nature: Being an Attempt to Introduce the Experimental Method of Reasoning Into Moral Subjects ; And, Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, Volume 1; A Treatise of Human Nature: Being an Attempt to Introduce the Experimental Method of Reasoning Into Moral Subjects ; And, Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, Thomas Hodge Grose; Volumes 1-2 of Philosophical works, David Hume
• Author: David Hume
• Editors: Thomas Hill Green, Thomas Hodge Grose
• Publisher: Longmans, Green, and Company, 1890
• Length: 1037 pages