Lucky War: Third Army in Desert Storm

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DIANE Publishing, 1997 - Persian Gulf War, 1991 - 390 pages
Provides an account, from the point of view of the U.S. Army forces employed, of the 1990-91 Persian Gulf War, from the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait to the withdrawal of coalition forces from southeastern Iraq. It focuses on the Army's part in this war, particularly the activities of the Headquarters, Third Army, and the Army Forces Central Command (ARCENT). It looks especially at the activities of the VII Corps, which executed ARCENT's main effort in the theater ground force schwerpunkt -- General Schwarzkopf's "Great Wheel." This is not an official history; the author speaks in his own voice and makes his own judgments. Maps.
 

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Well documented. I was there too. A very complex and dynamic adventure!

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Wow, I was there and never knew half of what really went on. This is a well written book, and well thought plus researched.

Contents

V
1
VI
17
VII
71
VIII
103
IX
139
X
175
XI
225
XII
279
XV
350
XVI
351
XVII
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XVIII
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XIX
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XX
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XXI
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XXII
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XIII
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XIV
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XXIII
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XXIV
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Page 367 - Persian Gulf Conflict Supplemental Authorization and Personnel Benefits Act of 1991 (Public Law 102-25), Washington DC: Department of Defense, April 1992 (hereafter cited as CPGW), p.
Page 340 - The personality of the general Is Indispensable, he is the head, he is the all of an army. The Gauls were not conquered by the Roman legions, but by Caesar. It was not before the Carthaginian soldiers that Rome was made to tremble, but before Hannibal. It was not the Macedonian phalanx which penetrated to India, but Alexander. It was not the French Army which reached the Weser and the Inn, it was Turenne. Prussia was not defended for seven years against the three most formidable European Powers by...
Page 66 - Memorandum for Secretaries of the Military Departments, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Under Secretaries of Defense Director, Defense Research and Engineering, Assistant Secretaries of Defense, General Counsel of the Department of Defense.
Page 170 - Pursuant to Title V of The Persian Gulf Conflict Supplemental Authorization and Personnel Benefits Act of 1991 (Public Law 102-25).
Page 337 - There is not one of them who has not learned to "... fill the unforgiving minute With sixty seconds
Page 340 - The recent conflict has wrought nearapocalyptic results upon the economic infrastructure of what had been, until January 1991, a rather highly urbanized and mechanized society. Now, most means of modern life support have been destroyed or rendered tenuous. Iraq has, for some time to come, been relegated to a pre-industrial age but with all the disabilities of post-industrial dependency on an intensive use of energy and technology".
Page 340 - The Gauls were not conquered by the Roman legions but by Caesar," said Napoleon, whose own history showed the potency of genius, but also that manpower, weather, and nationalism were not to be ignored. Operation: Focus of Inventory and Strategy When we speak of operation and of the quality of operation, we are at or near the common focus of the inventory and strategic...
Page 332 - Operational art is the employment of military forces to attain strategic goals in a theater of war or theater of operations through the design, organization, and conduct of campaigns and major operations.
Page 345 - We maintain, on the contrary, that war is simply a continuation of political intercourse, with the addition of other means. We deliberately use the phrase 'with the addition of other means' because we also want to make it clear that war in itself does not suspend political intercourse or change it into something entirely different. In essentials that intercourse continues, irrespective of the means it employs.
Page 73 - The object of all operations is to impose our will upon the enemy — to achieve our purposes. To do this we must throw the enemy off balance with a powerful blow from an unexpected direction, follow up rapidly to prevent his recovery and continue operations aggressively to achieve the higher commander's goals. The best results are obtained when powerful blows are struck against critical units or areas whose loss will degrade the coherence of enemy operations in depth, and thus most rapidly accomplish...

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