Propositional Content

Front Cover
Oxford University Press, 2015 - Language Arts & Disciplines - 227 pages
Peter Hanks defends a new theory about the nature of propositional content. According to this theory, the basic bearers of representational properties are particular mental or spoken actions. Propositions are types of these actions, which we use to classify and individuate our attitudes and
speech acts. Hanks abandons several key features of the traditional Fregean conception of propositional content, including the idea that propositions are the primary bearers of truth-conditions, the distinction between content and force, and the concept of entertainment. The main difficulty for this
traditional conception is the problem of the unity of the proposition, the problem of explaining how propositions have truth conditions and other representational properties. The new theory developed here, in its place, explains the unity of propositions and provides new solutions to a long list of
puzzles and problems in philosophy of language.
 

What people are saying - Write a review

We haven't found any reviews in the usual places.

Contents

Introduction
1
Three Pictures of Content
12
The Problem of the Unity of the Proposition
42
Predication and Unity
64
Cancellation and the ContentForce Distinction
90
Proper Names and Types of Reference Acts
113
Empty Names
131
Propositional Attitude Reports
149
Firstperson Propositions
170
Asking and Ordering
186
Conclusion
205
References
213
Index
223
Copyright

Other editions - View all

Common terms and phrases

About the author (2015)


Peter Hanks, University of Minnesota

Peter Hanks is an associate professor in the Department of Philosophy at the University of Minnesota. His research is in philosophy of language and the history of analytic philosophy.

Bibliographic information