Three Essays in Economics and Law |
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Page 49
... consumer willingness to pay . Hence S defines consumer's surplus in the absence of antitrust.36 · XR The most natural view of the efficient remedy is that the multiple μ equals 1 / ( 0-0 ) , while the damages base M equals the ...
... consumer willingness to pay . Hence S defines consumer's surplus in the absence of antitrust.36 · XR The most natural view of the efficient remedy is that the multiple μ equals 1 / ( 0-0 ) , while the damages base M equals the ...
Page 72
... consumer is resolved . Either the consumer receives the contracted for production good or it is unavailable . These two ex post situations are termed " product success " and " product failure " respectively . Product failure may be ...
... consumer is resolved . Either the consumer receives the contracted for production good or it is unavailable . These two ex post situations are termed " product success " and " product failure " respectively . Product failure may be ...
Page 73
... consumer and the firm take as given the function D ( Q , Z ) by which damages are computed . Consumer preferences over the two goods are represented by a quasi - concave preference function U ( Q , Z ) . In the product success state of ...
... consumer and the firm take as given the function D ( Q , Z ) by which damages are computed . Consumer preferences over the two goods are represented by a quasi - concave preference function U ( Q , Z ) . In the product success state of ...
Common terms and phrases
advertising anticompetitive antitrust damage remedy antitrust enforcement antitrust violations assumed assumption beer behavior brewers brewing industry buyer and seller buyer's probability assessment C₁ cartel coefficients competitive output consumer consumer's surplus consumption Coors D₂ damage multiple damage recovery decentralized equilibrium defined derived detection and conviction deter detrebling Econ econometric economies effect efficient damage remedy efficient output endogeneity equilibrium output ex ante exogenous factor prices firm's incentive increase indirect utility function informed buyer marginal cost marginal damage marginal revenue market failure market power market share markup maximize monopoly output moral hazard moral hazard problem oligopoly optimal order conditions Pabst parameters partial overcharge preferences are quasi-linear product differentiation product failure profit constraint profit maximization Proposition reliance expenditures residual demand curve residual demand elasticity resource allocation returns to scale seller's probability assessment Shavell social cost savings solves test statistic Theorem total overcharge damages treble damages V₁ V₂ W₂ zero