Handbook of Computational Social Choice
Felix Brandt, Vincent Conitzer, Ulle Endriss, Jérôme Lang, Ariel D. Procaccia
Cambridge University Press, Apr 25, 2016 - Business & Economics - 535 pages
The rapidly growing field of computational social choice, at the intersection of computer science and economics, deals with the computational aspects of collective decision making. This handbook, written by thirty-six prominent members of the computational social choice community, covers the field comprehensively. Chapters devoted to each of the field's major themes offer detailed introductions. Topics include voting theory (such as the computational complexity of winner determination and manipulation in elections), fair allocation (such as algorithms for dividing divisible and indivisible goods), coalition formation (such as matching and hedonic games), and many more. Graduate students, researchers, and professionals in computer science, economics, mathematics, political science, and philosophy will benefit from this accessible and self-contained book.
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Introduction to Computational Social Choice
Weighted Tournament Solutions
Dodgsons Rule and Youngs Rule
Barriers to Manipulation in Voting
Control and Bribery in Voting
Matching under Preferences
Weighted Voting Games
The Axiomatic Approach and the Internet
Other editions - View all
agenda agents aggregation algorithm allocation problems approval voting assigned assume axiomatic axioms ballot binary Borda score Brandt bribery bundle candidate Chapter coalition Condorcet winner Conitzer consider context defined definition denote discussed distance Dodgson approximation Dodgson score domain election elicitation Elkind envy-free example exists Faliszewski feedback arc set fixed-parameter tractable Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem given graph hedonic hedonic games Hemaspaandra input instance Kemeny Rank Lemma linear order manipulation maximal maximin minimal monotonicity necessary winner node notion NP-complete NP-hard number of voters objects optimal outcome Pareto Pareto optimal partial profile partition player plurality polynomial polynomial hierarchy polynomial-time preference order preference profile preference relation proof properties queries random ranked pairs requires restriction satisfies scoring rules Section sequential voting set of alternatives single-peaked social choice function social choice theory solution concepts strategyproof subset Theorem tournament solutions unique utility voter preferences weighted voting games winning