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action admit attainable believe benefit binding force capable character ciple claim common conduct conse consider considerations contrary cultivated degree derive deserve desire distinction duty Epicurean Epicurus equally eral ethics evil excitement existence expediency external sanctions fact give Greatest Happiness Principle habitual Herbert Spencer human nature hurt idea of justice impartiality individual inexpedient influence injustice instinct interest mankind maxims of justice means means of happiness ment mind mode moral obligation moralists motive natural justice necessary ness notion of justice objects obligation of justice opinion origin pain particular person philosophical piness pleasure positive law present principle of utility proof punishment question rational regard requires right and wrong rule selfish sentiment of justice social Social Statics society solely sources Stoic superior supposed sympathy tarian theory things tice tion transcendental treme ultimate uncon unjust utilitarian ethics utilitarian morality viduals violate virtue virtuous word
Page 15 - The creed which accepts as the foundation of morals, Utility, or the Greatest Happiness Principle, holds that actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness.
Page 79 - The only proof capable of being given that an object is visible is that people actually see it. The only proof that a sound is audible is that people hear it; and so of the other sources of our experience. In like manner, I apprehend, the sole evidence it is possible to produce that anything is desirable is that people do actually desire it.
Page 19 - Now, it is an unquestionable fact, that those who are equally acquainted with, and equally capable of appreciating and enjoying both, do give a most marked preference to the manner of existence which employs their higher faculties.
Page 26 - ... the sake of which all other things are desirable (whether we are considering our own good or that of other people), is an existence exempt as far as possible from pain, and as rich as possible in enjoyments, both in point of quantity and quality; the test of quality, and the rule for measuring it against quantity, being the preference felt by those who, in their opportunities of experience, to which must be added their habits of self-consciousness and selfobservation, are best furnished with...
Page 124 - To have a right, then, is, I conceive, to have something which society ought to defend me in the possession of. If the objector goes on to ask why it ought, I can give him no other reason than general utility.
Page 19 - ... person would be an ignoramus, no person of feeling and conscience would be selfish and base, even though they should be persuaded that the fool, the dunce, or the rascal is better satisfied with his lot than they are with theirs. They would not resign what they possess more than he, for the most complete satisfaction of all the desires which they have in common with him.
Page 59 - We must remember that only in these cases of conflict between secondary principles is it requisite that first principles should be appealed to. There is no case of moral obligation in which some secondary principle is not involved...
Page 143 - That principle is a mere form of words without rational signification, unless one person's happiness, supposed equal in degree (with the proper allowance made for kind), is counted for exactly as much as another's. Those conditions being supplied, Bentham's dictum, "everybody to count for one, nobody for more than one...
Page 10 - The subject is within the cognizance of the rational faculty; and neither does that faculty deal with it solely in the way of intuition. Considerations may be presented capable of determining the intellect either to give or withhold its assent to the doctrine ; and this is equivalent to proof.
Page 91 - ... operation by the force of habit, in opposition perhaps to the deliberate preference, as often happens with those who have contracted habits of vicious or hurtful indulgence. Third and last comes the case in which the habitual act of will in the individual instance, is not in contradiction to the general intention prevailing at other times, but in fulfilment of it...