The Federalist: A Collection of Essays, Written in Favor of the New Constitution, as Agreed Upon by the Federal Convention, September 17, 1787, Volume 1
Henry Barton Dawson
C. Scribner, 1863 - Constitutional law - 615 pages
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Page 289 - STATES, and to consist of one delegate from each state; and to appoint such other committees and civil officers as may be necessary for managing the general affairs of the United States under their direction...
Page 63 - Extend the sphere, and you take in a greater variety of parties and interests; you make it less probable that a majority of the whole will have a common motive to invade the rights of other citizens; or if such a common motive exists, it will be more difficult for all who feel it to discover their own strength, and to act in unison with each other.
Page 541 - ... that as nothing can contribute so much to its firmness and independence as permanency in office — this quality may, therefore, be justly regarded as an indispensable ingredient in its constitution, and in a great measure as the citadel of the public justice and the public security. The complete independence of the courts of justice is peculiarly essential in a limited constitution.
Page 171 - That the raising or keeping a standing army within the kingdom in time of peace, unless it be with consent of parliament, is against law.
Page 341 - that the legislative, executive, and " judiciary departments, shall be separate and distinct ; so that " neither exercise the powers properly belonging to the other...
Page 347 - If, therefore, the legislature assumes executive and judiciary powers, no opposition is likely to be made ; nor, if made, can it be effectual ; because in that case they may put their proceedings into the form of an act of assembly, which will render them obligatory on the other branches. They have accordingly, in many instances, decided rights which should have been left to judiciary controversy; and the direction of the executive, during the whole time of their session, is becoming habitual and...
Page 346 - For this reason that convention, which passed the ordinance of government, laid its foundation on this basis, that the legislative, executive, and judiciary departments should be separate and distinct, so that no person should exercise the powers of more than one of them at the same time.
Page 323 - The powers delegated by the proposed constitution, to the federal government, are few and defined ; those which are to remain in the State Governments, are numerous and indefinite...
Page 285 - It has been urged and echoed, that the power " to lay " and collect taxes, duties, imposts,- and excises, to pay " the debts, and provide for the common defence and " general welfare of the United States...