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Green was professor of Moral Philosophy at Oxford and had major influence during the later 19th and early 20th century in the shift from classical liberalism to the modern socialistic liberalism of ... Read full review
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according actual arise Aristotle assembly attained called capacity character citizen claim common conceive conception consciousness constitutes covenant crime derived desire determinate person distinction doctrine enforced established exer exercise existence expression fact facto force freedom fulfil function habitual obedience Hegel Hobbes human idea idea of perfection imperium implies individual institutions interest jura jure jus civile jus naturae justified labour law of nature legislative maintaining maintenance marriage means ment merely monogamy motives nation natural rights necessary obey object organisation pact particular perfection person or persons political society possession possible potentia prevent punishment question quod realisation reason recognised regard relation render resistance result rights of property Roman Empire Rousseau secured self-realising principle sense slave slavery social sove sovereign power sovereignty Spinoza statu naturali sui juris supposed supreme coercive power supreme power theory thing tion true viduals violation well-being
Page 61 - And in him consisteth the essence of the commonwealth; which, to define it, is "one person, of whose acts a great multitude by mutual covenants one with another have made themselves every one the author, to the end he may use the strength and means of them all as he shall think expedient, for their peace and common defence.
Page 86 - There is often a great difference between the will of all and the general will.
Page 64 - ... where there is no coercive power erected, that is, where there is no commonwealth, there is no propriety, all men having right to all things: therefore where there is no commonwealth, there nothing is unjust. So that the nature of justice consisteth in keeping of valid covenants; but the validity of covenants begins not but with the constitution of a civil power, sufficient to compel men to keep them; and then it is also that propriety begins.
Page 61 - I authorise and give up my right of governing myself to this man, or to this assembly of men, on this condition; that thou give up thy right to him, and authorise all his actions in like manner.
Page 79 - To what gross absurdities the following of custom when reason has left it may lead, we may be satisfied when we see the bare name of a town, of which there remains not so much as the ruins, where scarce so much housing as a sheep-cote, or more inhabitants than a shepherd is to be found, sends as many representatives to the grand assembly of law-makers as a whole county numerous in people and powerful in riches. This strangers stand amazed at, and every one must confess needs a remedy.
Page 79 - ... as many representatives to the grand assembly of law-makers as a whole county numerous in people and powerful in riches. This strangers stand amazed at, and every one must confess needs a remedy ; though most think it hard to find one, because the constitution of the legislative being the original and supreme act of the society, antecedent to all positive laws in it, and depending wholly on the people, no inferior power can alter it.
Page 95 - There is, in every independent political community — that is, in every political community not in the habit of obedience to a superior above itself — some single person or some combination of persons which has the power of compelling the other members of the community to do exactly as it pleases.
Page 65 - A law of nature, lex naturalis, is a precept or general rule, found out by reason, by which a man is forbidden to do that which is destructive of his life, or taketh away the means of preserving the same; and to omit that by which he thinketh it may be best preserved.
Page 94 - If a determinate human superior, not in a habit of obedience to a like superior, receive habitual obedience from the bulk of a given society, that determinate superior is sovereign in that society, and the society (including the superior) is a society political and independent.