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20th parallel 2nd Air Division 7th Air Force ABCCC air campaign air commander air component commander Air Force commander air operations air superiority airfields airmen airpower altitude anti-aircraft artillery ARVN assault assigned attack base battle bombers bombing halt Chiefs of Staff CINCPAC close air support combat command and control command structure COMUSMACV coordination CORONA HARVEST Report Corps DASC defenses destroy effective effort employed enemy enemy's FACs FEAF fighters fire flights ground forces Hanoi headquarters helicopter interdiction campaign Khe Sanh Korea Korean War Laos limited located LOCs logistical MACV major Marine MIGs military missiles missions Navy North Vietnamese operational control PACAF pilots radar reconnaissance Route Package SAMs Seventh Air Force sorties South Vietnam Southeast Asia strategic air strategy strike aircraft strike forces supplies Tactical Air Force target area Tedder Tet offensive Thailand theater threat troops units USAF VNAF weapons weather Westmoreland World War II
Page 191 - The real importance of the air war consisted in the fact that it opened a second front long before the invasion of Europe. That front was the skies over Germany.
Page 192 - Defense against air attacks required the production of thousands of anti-aircraft guns, the stockpiling of tremendous quantities of ammunition all over the country and holding in readiness hundreds of thousands of soldiers, who in addition had to stay in position by their guns, often totally inactive, for months at a time. As far as I can judge from the accounts I have read, no one has yet seen that this was the greatest lost battle on the German side. The losses from the retreats in Russia or from...
Page 111 - That degree of dominance in the air battle of one force over another which permits the conduct of operations by the former and its related land, sea, and air forces at a given time and place without prohibitive interference by the opposing force.
Page 173 - Finally, we hoped to make clear to the North Vietnamese leadership that so long as they continued their aggression against the South they would have to pay a price in the North.
Page 166 - The main difficulties that arose for us at the time of the invasion were the systematic preparations by your air force; the smashing of the main lines of communications, particularly the railway junctions. We had prepared for various eventualities . . . that all came to nothing or was rendered impossible by the destruction of railway communications, railway stations, etc.
Page 172 - Our purpose in Viet-Nam is to prevent the success of aggression. It is not conquest; it is not empire; it is not foreign bases; it is not domination. It is, simply put, just to prevent the forceful conquest of South Viet-Nam by North Viet-Nam.
Page 25 - Survey was established by the Secretary of War on 3 November 1944, pursuant to a directive 'from the late President Roosevelt. Its mission was to conduct an impartial and expert study of the effects of our aerial attack on Germany, to be used in connection with air attacks on Japan and to establish a basis for evaluating the importance and potentialities of air power as an instrument of military strategy...
Page 15 - ... attacks from the North on South Vietnam. August 2 and 4, 1964 For additional analytical, marketing, investment and business opportunities information, please contact Global Investment & Business Center, USA (202) 546-2103. Fax: (202) 546-3275. E-mail: email@example.com The Gulf of Tonkin Incident. North Vietnamese torpedo boats attacked the US destroyer Maddox in the Gulf of Tonkin. A second attack allegedly occurs on August 4. In November, 2005, the National Security Agency (NSA) released "previously...
Page 339 - Airpower can be strategically decisive if its application is intense, continuous, and focused on the enemy's vital systems.