Competitive Governments: An Economic Theory of Politics and Public Finance

Albert Breton

Cambridge University Press, Sep 28, 1998 - Business & Economics - 385 pages

Competitive Governments systematically explores the hypothesis that governments are internally competitive, that they are competitive in their relations with each other and in their relations with other institutions in society which, like them, supply consuming households with goods and services. Breton contends that competition not only serves to bring the political system to an equilibrium, but it also leads to a revelation of the households' true demand functions for publicly provided goods and services and to the molding of a link between the quantities and the qualities demanded and supplied and the tax prices paid for these goods and services.

Contents

• The conceptual framework: 3
• 11 Goods and services defined: 5
• 12 Models of government: 9
• 13 Concepts of efficiency: 17
• 14 Requisites of democracy: 24
• 15 Competition: 30
• 16 Assembling the building blocks: 34
• Demand and its revelation: 37
• 21 Utility maximization: 42
• i Taxprices: 43
• ii Freeriding: 44
• iii Substitution: 46
• 22 Demand revelation: 48
• i Motivation: 49
• ii Mechanism: 52
• 23 Demand lobbies: 57
• i Aggregation and the interaction of demand lobbies with centers of power: 59
• ii Shirking by lobby members: 61
• iii Reverse shirking by lobby managers: 64
• iv Collusion and rentseeking: 65
• 24 The Wicksellian Connection: 66
• 25 Conclusion: 69
• Checks and balances: 70
• 31 Compound governments: 71
• 32 Definitions and assumptions: 74
• i Checking and balancing: 75
• ii Checking instruments illustrated: 76
• 33 A formal model and some implications: 79
• 34 The Wicksellian Connection anew: 87
• 35 A digression on American exceptionalism: 90
• 36 Balanced governments: 93
• 37 Conclusion: 95
• Budgetary processes: 96
• 41 The budgetary process of parliamentary governments: 98
• ii The model: 101
• 42 The budgetary process of congressional governments: 111
• i Stylized structure: 112
• ii The model: 114
• 43 The Wicksellian Connection once again: 118
• 44 Conclusion: 121
• Consent suffrage and support: 122
• 51 A model of political consent: 123
• i A Vox Dei dispensation model: 125
• ii A Vox Populi dispensation model: 129
• 52 Introducing suffrage and support: 134
• 53 Collusion and breakdown: 141
• 54 The Wicksellian Connection once more: 146
• Hierarchy and bureaucracy: 148
• 61 The problem defined: 149
• 62 Models of inefficient bureaus: 155
• ii The discretionary power model: 162
• 63 Models of efficient bureaus and bureaucracies: 167
• ii Bureaucracies: 176
• 64 Conclusion: 178
• A retrospective overview: 181
• 71 More definitions: 183
• 72 Vertical competition: 184
• 73 Horizontal competition: 190
• 74 Conclusion: 194
• The organization of governmental systems: 196
• 81 The standard explanation: 197
• 82 An alternative explanation: 203
• i Technology: 204
• ii Coordination costs: 209
• b Nature: 210
• c Effects: 212
• iii Contractual enforcement costs: 213
• iv Caveats: 222
• b Collusion: 223
• 84 The Wicksellian Connection remembered: 226
• 85 Conclusion: 227
• Competition stability and central governments: 228
• 91 The inducements to compete: 229
• i Tiebouts potential entry and exit mechanism: 230
• ii Salmons external benchmark mechanism: 233
• 92 Some empirical evidence on intergovernmental competition: 235
• ii Estimates of political mobility: 238
• iii Analysis of price rivalry: 239
• 93 Horizontal competition and stability: 240
• i Policy and program diffusion: 241
• ii Political mobility: 243
• iii Price rivalry: 245
• 95 Securing stability: 248
• i Why use monitors?: 249
• ii Monitoring horizontal competition: 250
• b Regional policies: 251
• c Intergovernmental grants: 254
• iii Monitoring vertical competition: 258
• a Bicameralism: 259
• b Intrastate federalism: 260
• c Constitutional entrenchment: 261
• 96 The Wicksellian Connection reconsidered: 262
• The world order: 264
• 101 International competition: 267
• 102 International regimes: 271
• 103 The European Union: 275
• 104 Conclusion: 276
• Sociopolitical structures: 277
• The size of the nonmarket sector: 279
• 111 Nonprofit organizations: 280
• 112 An alternative perspective: 282
• 113 Goods are goods: 284
• 114 Conclusion: 285
• The growth of governments: 286
• 121 The determinants of supply: 288
• i Some preliminaries: 289
• ii Differential productivity growth of conventional inputs: 293
• iii Differential growth in the capacity to control freeriding: 295
• iv Differential growth in the ability to acquire information: 302
• 122 Equilibrium and growth: 304
• 123 Conclusion: 308
• Conclusion: 311
• Longterm budget deficits: 315
• The power of small groups: 318
• The independence of judiciaries: 321
• Information and pressure: 326
• An empirical Wicksellian Connection?: 328
• Overlap and duplication: 331
• The structure and stability of federal states: 334
• References: 337
• Name index: 363
• Subject index: 369

Bibliographic information

• Title: Competitive Governments: An Economic Theory of Politics and Public Finance
• Author: Albert Breton
• Edition: illustrated, reprint
• Publisher: Cambridge University Press, 1998
• ISBN: 0521646286, 9780521646284
• Length: 385 pages
• Subjects: Business & Economics / Economic History; Business & Economics / Economics / Microeconomics; Business & Economics / Economics / Theory; Business & Economics / Public Finance