Law and Psychiatry: Rethinking the Relationship
This book is about the competing images of man offered us by the disciplines of law and psychiatry. Michael Moore describes the legal view of persons as rational and autonomous and defends it from the challenges presented by three psychiatric ideas: that badness is illness, that the unconscious rules our mental life, and that a person is a community of selves more than a unified single self. Using the tools of modern philosophy, he attempts to show that the moral metaphysical foundations of our law are not eroded by these challenges of psychiatry. The book thus seeks, through philosophy, to go beneath the centuries-old debates between lawyers and psychiatrists, and to reveal their hidden agreement about the nature of man. Some attention is paid to practical legal and psychiatric issues of contemporary concern, such as the proper definition of mental illness for psychiatric purposes, and the proper definition of legal insanity for legal purposes. This book was first announced, for publication in hard covers, in the Press's January to July seasonal list.
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The idea of practical reason and explanation in
The legal view of persons
The challenge of psychiatry
Does madness exist?
Psychiatry and the concept of mental illness
The legal concept of insanity
Two experiments in merging legal and psychiatric
Does the unconscious exist?
The nature of psychoanalytic explanation in terms of
The unconscious as the source of an increased
actor agent argument attempt basic act basic action behavior belief/desire set beliefs and desires brain causal cause Chapter character claim compulsion concept conflict conscious criminal law culpability defined definition of mental discussed distinction disunity dream emotions entities Ernst Nagel example excuse extended memory fact Freud Freudian function G. E. M. Anscombe H. L. A. Hart harm human action Ibid idea insanity defense intelligible intentional actions intentionally interpretation irrational justified kind knowledge legal insanity logical meaning mental illness metapsychology mind Model Penal Code moral myth notion objects one's ordinary pain perform philosophical physical Pollard practical reasoning practical syllogism presuppose presupposition privileged access problem psychiatrists psychoanalytic theory psychology question Rat-Man rational reason-giving explanations reasons for action repressed responsibility scious sense social Standard Edition superego syllogism symptoms Szasz things thought tion uncon unconscious mental unconscious wishes University Press view of persons words