The Sources of Normativity
Ethical concepts are, or purport to be, normative. They make claims on us: they command, oblige, recommend, or guide. Or at least when we invoke them, we make claims on one another; but where does their authority over us - or ours over one another - come from? Christine Korsgaard identifies four accounts of the source of normativity that have been advocated by modern moral philosophers: voluntarism, realism, reflective endorsement, and the appeal to autonomy. She traces their history, showing how each developed in response to the prior one and comparing their early versions with those on the contemporary philosophical scene. Kant's theory that normativity springs from our own autonomy emerges as a synthesis of the other three, and Korsgaard concludes with her own version of the Kantian account. Her discussion is followed by commentary from G. A. Cohen, Raymond Geuss, Thomas Nagel, and Bernard Williams, and a reply by Korsgaard.
What people are saying - Write a review
We haven't found any reviews in the usual places.
The normative question
The authority of reflection
The origin of value and the scope of obligation
Reason humanity and the moral law
Morality and identity
agent animal answer argued argument Aristotle authority autonomous believe Bernard Williams categorical imperative causality Christine Korsgaard citizen claims commit consciousness course desires disapprove duty egoistic ethics existence explain fact G. A. Cohen Geuss give Hobbes human nature Hume Hume's hypothetical imperative idea identify impulse intrinsically normative justified Kant Kant's Kantian kind Kingdom of Ends lecture live Mafioso mative maxim means Mill mind moral concepts moral law moral obligation moral philosophy moral realism motive Nagel Nietzsche normative concepts normative entities normative question objection ONORA O'NEILL ourselves pain person perspective philosophers Plato point of view practical identity Prichard principle of choice private reasons problem Pufendorf rational Raymond Geuss reason for action reflective endorsement reject requires Schneewind seems sensation social someone sort sovereign suppose theory thing Thomas Nagel thought tion tive true truth utilitarian virtue Wittgenstein wrong