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actually admit affection already analysis appear assert authority believe called certainly cognition colour common sense complete conceive condition consciousness consequently constitutes contradiction criticism direct Disc discriminate doctrine doubt element equally evidence example existence experience expression extension external reality extracts fact faculties feeling figure give Hamilton hand Hegel hold immediate intuitive Kant knowledge known less light material matter means Meta mind modes nature necessary nervous never non-ego object once organism original outer perceive perception perhaps phenomenal philosophy position possibility present primary qualities principles priori proper prove question reader reason reference regards Reid Reid's relation relative remark resistance Review secondary Secret seems seen sensation side simple single space stand Stirling Stirling's subjective suppose testimony theory things thought tion touch true truth ultimate universal unknown volume whole writer
Page 111 - We have here a remarkable conflict between two contradictory opinions, wherein all mankind are engaged. On the one side stand all the vulgar, who are unpractised in philosophical researches, and guided by the uncorrupted primary instincts of nature. On the other side, stand all the Philosophers ancient and modern; every man without exception who reflects. In this division, to my great humiliation, I find myself classed with the vulgar.
Page 28 - To whatever I have said of you already, therefore, I now volunteer to add, that I think you not only the one man in Britain capable of bringing Metaphysical Philosophy, in the ultimate, German or European, and highest actual form of it. distinctly home to the understanding of British men who wish to understand it, but that I notice in you farther, on the moral side, a sound strength of intellectual discernment, a noble valour and reverence of mind, which seems to me to mark you out as the man capable...
Page 1 - An Introduction to Mental Philosophy, on the Inductive Method. By JD MORELL, MA LL.D. 8vo. 12s. Elements of Psychology, containing the Analysis of the Intellectual Powers. By the same Author. Post 8vo. 7s. 6d. The Secret of Hegel: being the Hegelian System in Origin, Principle, Form, and Matter.
Page 102 - it is truly an idle problem to attempt imagining the steps by which we may be supposed to have acquired the notion of extension ; when in fact we are unable to imagine to ourselves the possibility of that notion not being always in our possession.
Page 70 - S57b,sq.) 21. Nay, the Perception proper, accompanying a sensation proper, is not an apprehension, far less a representation, of the external or internal stimulus, or concause, which determines the affection whereof the sensation is the consciousness. —Not the former ; for the stimulus or concause of a sensation is always, in itself, to consciousness unknown. Not the latter; for this would turn Perception into Imagination — reduce it from an immediate, and assertory, and objective, into a mediate,...
Page 113 - In this country in particular, some of those who opposed it to the skeptical conclusions of Hume did not sufficiently counteract the notion which the name might naturally suggest ; they did not emphatically proclaim that it was no appeal to the undeveloped beliefs of the unreflective many ; and they did not inculcate that it presupposed a critical analysis of these beliefs by the philosophers themselves.
Page 119 - Propositions of this kind are discoverable by the mere operation of thought, without dependence on what is anywhere existent in the universe.
Page 72 - That the notion of space is a necessary condition of thought, and that, as such, it is impossible to derive it from experience, has been cogently demonstrated by Kant...
Page 6 - The sum of our knowledge of the connection of mind and body is, therefore, this, — that the mental modifications are dependent on certain corporeal conditions ; but of the nature of these conditions we know nothing.