An Economic THeory of Democracy1957 |
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Page 4
... analysis . There- fore economists must assume an ordering of behavior takes place . There is no a priori reason to suppose that this ordering is ra- tional , i.e. , reasonably directed toward the achievement of conscious goals ...
... analysis . There- fore economists must assume an ordering of behavior takes place . There is no a priori reason to suppose that this ordering is ra- tional , i.e. , reasonably directed toward the achievement of conscious goals ...
Page 153
... analysis shows that voters faced with the conjectural- variation problem have at least three possible choices of action . How- ever , there is no reason to assume a priori that all voters make the same choice . In fact , we believe that ...
... analysis shows that voters faced with the conjectural- variation problem have at least three possible choices of action . How- ever , there is no reason to assume a priori that all voters make the same choice . In fact , we believe that ...
Page 231
... analysis onto specialists . But how can the inexpert citizen know whether the experts ' analyses are accurate ... analysis of facts onto experts reduces the cost of such analysis tremendously , some cost still remains . It must be paid ...
... analysis onto specialists . But how can the inexpert citizen know whether the experts ' analyses are accurate ... analysis of facts onto experts reduces the cost of such analysis tremendously , some cost still remains . It must be paid ...
Contents
vi | 19 |
Party Motivation and the Function | 21 |
CONTENTS | 29 |
Copyright | |
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abstain actually alternative ambiguous analysis assume assumption axiom basic benefits cause ceteris paribus coalition competition conclusion cost of voting decision-making definition democracy depends desire distribution of voters division of labor effect election period electorate equal equilibrium ernment example exist extremist fact favor favorite party gain goals government action government's groups hence hypothesis ideologies indifferent individual influence irrational issue J. R. Hicks Kenneth Arrow legislature majority principle marginal marginal cost maximize means ment motives multiparty system normative number of parties oligopoly opposition party outcome Paretian optimum party differential party's passionate majority platforms political parties position possible predict preferences proportional representation rational behavior rational citizen rational voter real world reason reëlected reliability social society strategy structure tion two-party system uncertainty utility functions utility incomes V. O. Key views voting decision Welfare Economics zero