An Economic THeory of Democracy1957 |
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Page 255
... conclusion as follows : men are more likely to exert political influence in their roles as income - receivers than in their roles as income- spenders , whether acting as private citizens or as members of a cor- porate entity . This ...
... conclusion as follows : men are more likely to exert political influence in their roles as income - receivers than in their roles as income- spenders , whether acting as private citizens or as members of a cor- porate entity . This ...
Page 257
... conclusion emphasizes once more the inherent in- equality of political power in democratic societies . Democracy is often defined as " government by consent of the governed . " We can further define " government by consent of the ...
... conclusion emphasizes once more the inherent in- equality of political power in democratic societies . Democracy is often defined as " government by consent of the governed . " We can further define " government by consent of the ...
Page 267
... conclude either that ( 1 ) since so many others are going to vote , his ballot is not worth casting or ( 2 ) since ... conclusion , every citizen votes unless he is indifferent . Both these outcomes are self - defeating . When no one ...
... conclude either that ( 1 ) since so many others are going to vote , his ballot is not worth casting or ( 2 ) since ... conclusion , every citizen votes unless he is indifferent . Both these outcomes are self - defeating . When no one ...
Contents
vi | 19 |
Party Motivation and the Function | 21 |
CONTENTS | 29 |
Copyright | |
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abstain actually alternative ambiguous analysis assume assumption axiom basic benefits cause ceteris paribus coalition competition conclusion cost of voting decision-making definition democracy depends desire distribution of voters division of labor effect election period electorate equal equilibrium ernment example exist extremist fact favor favorite party gain goals government action government's groups hence hypothesis ideologies indifferent individual influence irrational issue J. R. Hicks Kenneth Arrow legislature majority principle marginal marginal cost maximize means ment motives multiparty system normative number of parties oligopoly opposition party outcome Paretian optimum party differential party's passionate majority platforms political parties position possible predict preferences proportional representation rational behavior rational citizen rational voter real world reason reƫlected reliability social society strategy structure tion two-party system uncertainty utility functions utility incomes V. O. Key views voting decision Welfare Economics zero