An Economic THeory of Democracy1957 |
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Page 8
... irrational ones ? If rationality really means efficiency , are inefficient men always irrational , or can rational men also act inefficiently ? C. IRRATIONALITY AND THE BASIC FUNCTION OF POLITICAL RATIONALITY To distinguish clearly ...
... irrational ones ? If rationality really means efficiency , are inefficient men always irrational , or can rational men also act inefficiently ? C. IRRATIONALITY AND THE BASIC FUNCTION OF POLITICAL RATIONALITY To distinguish clearly ...
Page 9
... irrational behavior . A rational man who is systematically making some mistake will cease to do so if ( 1 ) he discovers what the mistake is and ( 2 ) the cost of eliminating it is smaller than the benefits therefrom . Under the same ...
... irrational behavior . A rational man who is systematically making some mistake will cease to do so if ( 1 ) he discovers what the mistake is and ( 2 ) the cost of eliminating it is smaller than the benefits therefrom . Under the same ...
Page 10
... irrational in its behavior , a difficult problem is posed for the man who does not . How should he act ? What is the best course for a rational man in an irrational world ? The answer depends upon whether the irrationality he faces in ...
... irrational in its behavior , a difficult problem is posed for the man who does not . How should he act ? What is the best course for a rational man in an irrational world ? The answer depends upon whether the irrationality he faces in ...
Contents
vi | 19 |
Party Motivation and the Function | 21 |
CONTENTS | 29 |
Copyright | |
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abstain actually alternative ambiguous analysis assume assumption axiom basic benefits cause ceteris paribus coalition competition conclusion cost of voting decision-making definition democracy depends desire distribution of voters division of labor effect election period electorate equal equilibrium ernment example exist extremist fact favor favorite party gain goals government action government's groups hence hypothesis ideologies indifferent individual influence irrational issue J. R. Hicks Kenneth Arrow legislature majority principle marginal marginal cost maximize means ment motives multiparty system normative number of parties oligopoly opposition party outcome Paretian optimum party differential party's passionate majority platforms political parties position possible predict preferences proportional representation rational behavior rational citizen rational voter real world reason reƫlected reliability social society strategy structure tion two-party system uncertainty utility functions utility incomes V. O. Key views voting decision Welfare Economics zero