An Economic THeory of Democracy1957 |
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Page 79
Anthony Downs. II . REASON , KNOWLEDGE , AND INFORMATION A distinction of which we will make more explicit use is that be- tween reason , contextual knowledge , and information . Reason is facility with the processes of logical thought ...
Anthony Downs. II . REASON , KNOWLEDGE , AND INFORMATION A distinction of which we will make more explicit use is that be- tween reason , contextual knowledge , and information . Reason is facility with the processes of logical thought ...
Page 91
... reason to exaggerate ( though our assumption of no false information prevents outright lying ) . Thus they masquerade as representatives of a major- ity of citizens , even though they are actually lobbyists for some par- ticular group ...
... reason to exaggerate ( though our assumption of no false information prevents outright lying ) . Thus they masquerade as representatives of a major- ity of citizens , even though they are actually lobbyists for some par- ticular group ...
Page 264
... reason to believe that men who know their true preferences are less likely to be indifferent than those who do not . In our opinion , the proposition is false . The amount of information a man has necessarily affects the confidence with ...
... reason to believe that men who know their true preferences are less likely to be indifferent than those who do not . In our opinion , the proposition is false . The amount of information a man has necessarily affects the confidence with ...
Contents
vi | 19 |
Party Motivation and the Function | 21 |
CONTENTS | 29 |
Copyright | |
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abstain actually alternative ambiguous analysis assume assumption axiom basic benefits cause ceteris paribus coalition competition conclusion cost of voting decision-making definition democracy depends desire distribution of voters division of labor effect election period electorate equal equilibrium ernment example exist extremist fact favor favorite party gain goals government action government's groups hence hypothesis ideologies indifferent individual influence irrational issue J. R. Hicks Kenneth Arrow legislature majority principle marginal marginal cost maximize means ment motives multiparty system normative number of parties oligopoly opposition party outcome Paretian optimum party differential party's passionate majority platforms political parties position possible predict preferences proportional representation rational behavior rational citizen rational voter real world reason reƫlected reliability social society strategy structure tion two-party system uncertainty utility functions utility incomes V. O. Key views voting decision Welfare Economics zero