An Economic THeory of Democracy1957 |
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Page 240
... zero . But because time is spent in ab- sorbing any data , the cost of political information is never zero . Apparently , men with zero party differentials are irrational if they in- vest in any political information to help them make ...
... zero . But because time is spent in ab- sorbing any data , the cost of political information is never zero . Apparently , men with zero party differentials are irrational if they in- vest in any political information to help them make ...
Page 261
... zero , so his vote value must also be zero . It appears that he obtains no return from voting unless he prefers one party over the others ; hence indifferent citizens always abstain . However , this conclusion is false , because the ...
... zero , so his vote value must also be zero . It appears that he obtains no return from voting unless he prefers one party over the others ; hence indifferent citizens always abstain . However , this conclusion is false , because the ...
Page 262
... zero , the return from voting per se is also zero , but when voting is costly , the return from voting per se is positive . The second of these assertions we discuss later ; now let us examine the first one.2 Democracy cannot operate ...
... zero , the return from voting per se is also zero , but when voting is costly , the return from voting per se is positive . The second of these assertions we discuss later ; now let us examine the first one.2 Democracy cannot operate ...
Contents
vi | 19 |
Party Motivation and the Function | 21 |
CONTENTS | 29 |
Copyright | |
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Common terms and phrases
abstain actually alternative ambiguous analysis assume assumption axiom basic benefits cause ceteris paribus coalition competition conclusion cost of voting decision-making definition democracy depends desire distribution of voters division of labor effect election period electorate equal equilibrium ernment example exist extremist fact favor favorite party gain goals government action government's groups hence hypothesis ideologies indifferent individual influence irrational issue J. R. Hicks Kenneth Arrow legislature majority principle marginal marginal cost maximize means ment motives multiparty system normative number of parties oligopoly opposition party outcome Paretian optimum party differential party's passionate majority platforms political parties position possible predict preferences proportional representation rational behavior rational citizen rational voter real world reason reƫlected reliability social society strategy structure tion two-party system uncertainty utility functions utility incomes V. O. Key views voting decision Welfare Economics zero