Reasons and Recognition: Essays on the Philosophy of T.M. Scanlon
R. Jay Wallace, Rahul Kumar, Samuel Freeman
Oxford University Press, USA, Sep 15, 2011 - Law - 379 pages
For close to forty years now T.M. Scanlon has been one of the most important contributors to moral and political philosophy in the Anglo-American world. Through both his writing and his teaching, he has played a central role in shaping the questions with which research in moral and political philosophy now grapples. Reasons and Recognition brings together fourteen new papers on an array of topics from the many areas to which Scanlon has made path-breaking contributions, each of which develops a distinctive and independent position while critically engaging with central themes from Scanlon's own work in the area. Contributors include well-known senior figures in moral and political philosophy as well as important younger scholars whose work is just beginning to gain wider recognition. Taken together, these papers make evident the scope and lasting interest of Scanlon's contributions to moral and political philosophy while contributing to a deeper understanding of the issues addressed in his work.
What people are saying - Write a review
We haven't found any reviews in the usual places.
Other editions - View all
affected agent angry blame appeal argue argument attitude of tolerance attitude-based basic behavioral dispositions believe Bernard Williams Cambridge Christine Korsgaard citizens claim conception concern consequentialist conservatism conservative considerations constitute context contractualism contractualist decision democratic Derek Parfit discussion distinct distribution distributive justice emotional endorsement equal essay example explain fact favor friendship G. A. Cohen global grounds Harvard University human idea impairment impersonal important individuals intention intrinsic desires involves John Rawls Joseph Raz judgment justice justifiable kind luck egalitarianism matter means Michael Otsuka moral motivation normative objection one’s Oxford University Press particular perfect duty Philosophy plausible political practical principle psychopaths question rational reasonably reject recognition recognize redundant promises regard relation relationship relevant requires rescuer respect response role saved Scanlon Scanlon’s account second-order desires seems sense significance simply social someone standard standing suggests theory things tion tolerant person valuable wrong