The Nature of Truth: An Essay

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Clarendon Press, 1906 - Knowledge, Theory of - 182 pages
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Page 37 - It may be said — and this is, I believe, the correct view — that there is no problem at all in truth and falsehood ; that some propositions are true and some false, just as some roses are red and some white...
Page 66 - significant whole' is such that all its constituent elements reciprocally involve one another, or reciprocally determine one another's being as contributory features in a single concrete meaning.
Page 175 - And since all human discursive knowledge remains thought ' about ' an Other, any and every theory of the nature of truth must itself be ' about ' truth as its Other ; ie, the CoherenceNotion of truth on its own admission can never rise above the level of knowledge which at the best attains to the truth of correspondence.
Page 52 - ... that truth and falsehood apply not to beliefs, but to their objects ; and that the object of a thought, even when this object does not exist, has a Being which is in no way dependent upon its being an object of thought : all these are theses which, though generally rejected, can nevertheless be supported by arguments which deserve at least a refutation.
Page 76 - Its organization is the process of its self-fulfilment, and the concrete manifestation of its individuality. But this process is no mere surface-play between static parts within the whole: nor is the individuality of the whole, except in the movement which is its manifestation.
Page 129 - The angles at the base of an isosceles triangle are equal to one another; and if the equal sides be produced, the angles -upon the other side of the base shall be equal.
Page 37 - The discussion of indefinables — which forms the chief part of philosophical logic — is the endeavour to see clearly, and to make others see clearly, the entities concerned, in order that the mind may have that kind of acquaintance with them which it has with redness or the taste of a pineapple.
Page 127 - Who did you pass on the road?' the King went on, holding out his hand to the Messenger for some more hay. "Nobody, ' said the Messenger. "Quite right,' said the King: "this young lady saw him too. So of course Nobody walks slower than you.
Page 66 - conceivable' means to be a ' significant whole', or a whole possessed of meaning for thought. A 'significant whole...
Page 37 - Falsity', in the only strict sense of the terms, are characteristics of ' Propositions'. Every Proposition, in itself and in entire independence of mind, is true or false ; and only Propositions can be true or false. The truth or falsity of a Proposition is, so to say, its flavour, which we must recognize, if we recognize it at all, immediately : much as we appreciate the flavour of pineapple or the taste of gorgonzola.

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