Signals: Evolution, Learning, and InformationBrian Skyrms presents a fascinating exploration of how fundamental signals are to our world. He uses a variety of tools -- theories of signaling games, information, evolution, and learning -- to investigate how meaning and communication develop. He shows how signaling games themselves evolve, and introduces a new model of learning with invention. The juxtaposition of atomic signals leads to complex signals, as the natural product of gradual process. Signals operate in networks of senders and receivers at all levels of life. Information is transmitted, but it is also processed in various ways. That is how we think -- signals run around a very complicated signaling network. Signaling is a key ingredient in the evolution of teamwork, in the human but also in the animal world, even in micro-organisms. Communication and co-ordination of action are different aspects of the flow of information, and are both effected by signals. |
Contents
Introduction | 1 |
1 Signals | 5 |
2 Signals in Nature | 20 |
3 Information | 33 |
4 Evolution | 48 |
5 Evolution in Lewis Signaling Games | 63 |
6 Deception | 73 |
7 Learning | 83 |
10 Inventing New Signals | 118 |
Logic and Information Processing | 136 |
12 Complex Signals and Compositionality | 145 |
Teamwork | 149 |
14 Learning to Network | 161 |
Postscript | 177 |
References | 179 |
| 197 | |
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Common terms and phrases
Act I Act action alarm calls average payoff bacteria ball Behavior best response Bush-Mosteller Chapter chickadee colors complex signals consider cooperative correlation deception decision problem Democritus Diana monkeys emergence of signaling equilibrium equiprobable Erev evolution of signaling evolutionarily stable strategy evolve example guests Hawk individuals informational content initial weights interactions invention kind Kula Kula ring law of effect learn to signal learning dynamics learning parameter leopard Lewis signaling game logic misinformation moves the probability mutation Nash equilibrium natural salience nature chooses network formation number of signals optimal partial pooling partition Pemantle players playing pooling equilibria population possible predator probe and adjust quantity of information quorum-sensing random reinforcement learning replicator dynamics response with inertia ring rock-scissors-paper Roth-Erev send signal sender and receiver sender observes sender-receiver signaling networks signaling system simplest simulations Skyrms species spontaneously structure Suppose synonyms teamwork tion trials types urn model vervets waggle dance zero