Handbook of Public Economics, Volume 5Alan J. Auerbach, Raj Chetty, Martin Feldstein, Emmanuel Saez In the Handbook of Public Economics, vol. 5, top scholars provide context and order to new research about mechanisms that underlie both public finance theories and applications. These fundamental subjects follow the recent, steady movement away from rational decision-making and toward more personalized approaches to tax generation and expenditure, especially in terms of the use of psychological methods and financial incentives. Closely scrutinized subjects include new research in empirical (instead of theoretical) public finance, the methods for measuring taxes (both in revenue generation and expenditure), and the roles that taxes play in specific settings, such as emerging economies, urban settings, charitable giving, and among political entities (cities, counties, states, countries). Contributors look at both the "tax" and "expenditure" sides of public finance, emphasizing recent influences that psychology and philosophy have exerted in economics with articles on behavioral finance, charitable giving, and dynamic taxation. To a field enjoying rapid growth, their articles bring context and order, illuminating the mechanisms that underlie both public finance theories and applications. - Editor Raj Chetty is the recipient of the 2013 John Bates Clark Medal from the American Economic Association - Focuses on new approaches to both revenue generation and expenditures in public finance - Presents coherent summaries of subjects in public economics that stretch from methodologies to applications - Makes details about public economics accessible to scholars in fields outside economics |
Contents
| 1 | |
Taxation and Development | 51 |
Connecting Theory to Data | 111 |
Urban Public Finance | 195 |
The Theory of International Tax Competition and Coordination | 257 |
Other editions - View all
Handbook of Public Economics, Volume 5 Alan J. Auerbach,Raj Chetty,Martin S. Feldstein,Emmanuel Saez No preview available - 2013 |
Common terms and phrases
adverse selection American Economic Review analysis Andreoni approach assume assumption behavioral responses bequest motive capital gains capital income charity Chetty choice choose constraints consumption cost countries curve discussed donations donors earnings effect efficient elasticity empirical endogenous estate tax estimates evidence externality federal fiscal capacity formula function fundraising gift health insurance Hence heterogeneity higher impact implies incentives income effects income tax income taxation increase individuals insurance markets Journal of Economics Journal of Public Kopczuk labor supply literature marginal tax rate marginal utility marginal welfare weights maximize Mirrlees moral hazard Nash equilibrium optimal tax Piketty Political Economy preferences programs Public Economics public finance Quarterly Journal redistribution reduce relative result risk Saez Slemrod social insurance social welfare spending sufficient statistic tax avoidance tax base tax competition tax havens tax revenue tax system theory top tax rate transfers UI benefits urban wage wealth