Power And Prosperity: Outgrowing Communist And Capitalist DictatorshipsWhy do some economies do better than others? How does society encourage the kind of market economy that generates continually increasing incomes? How do particular styles of government affect economic performance? World-renowned economist Mancur Olson tackles these questions and others in what will surely be regarded as his magnum opus.Olson contends that governments can play an essential role in the development of markets. Reliable enforcement of private contracts and protection of individual rights to property depend on governments strong enough to guarantee these rights yet constrained enough not to undermine them. His exploration of "market-augmenting governments” will stand as a cutting-edge work on economic growth and provide a useful framework in which to consider the Asian financial crisis and its aftermath. As Susan Lee noted in Forbes, "his pioneering insights might have won a Nobel Prize for Olson had he lived a bit longer.” |
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Contents
THE LOGIC OF POWER | 1 |
TIME TAKINGS | 25 |
TRANSACTIONS COSTS | 45 |
Copyright | |
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Power And Prosperity: Outgrowing Communist And Capitalist Dictatorships Mancur Olson No preview available - 2000 |
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anarchy argument autocracy autocrat benefit better capital Chapter Coase theorem Coaseian bargain collective action communism communist competition contract rights crime criminal deadweight losses democracy democratic dictatorships economic growth economists efficient encompassing interest enforcement enterprises example explain firms gains from trade Glorious Revolution implicit tax increase individual rights industry inputs institutions investment large group leader less lobbying Logic of Collective Mafia family majority managers Mancur Olson marginal market economy ment mutually advantageous national income needed nomic normally obtain organized outcome output Pareto-efficient parties peaceful order political Prisoner's Dilemma production property and contract prosperity rational rationally ignorant redistribution regime rent seeking representative government roving bandit ruling interest self-enforcing self-interest share small groups Soviet Union Soviet-type societies Stalin stationary bandit superencompassing tax collections tax rate tax theft taxation theory third world tion tive transactions costs transition voluntary wage workers World War II