Antitrust Equal Enforcement Act of 1979, S. 1468: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Antitrust, Monopoly, and Business Rights of the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, Ninety-Sixth Congress, First Session, on S. 1468, June 8 and 12, 1979 |
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Results 1-5 of 27
Page 2
... antitrust violators so that no single party should have to pay more than his share of the damages . If the colluding parties share equal responsibility for their violations , for example , in horizontal price - fixing cases , each party ...
... antitrust violators so that no single party should have to pay more than his share of the damages . If the colluding parties share equal responsibility for their violations , for example , in horizontal price - fixing cases , each party ...
Page 5
... Antitrust damages generally serve two important purposes . One is the compensation of victims ; the other is the deterrence of antitrust violations . In examining the proposal , one must look at both the fairness ques- tion and also ...
... Antitrust damages generally serve two important purposes . One is the compensation of victims ; the other is the deterrence of antitrust violations . In examining the proposal , one must look at both the fairness ques- tion and also ...
Page 7
... Antitrust, Monopoly, and Business Rights. tion questions are mentioned ... antitrust violation you wish to have addressed . This proposal addresses price ... violations , to allow it only for noncriminal violations , or perhaps allow ...
... Antitrust, Monopoly, and Business Rights. tion questions are mentioned ... antitrust violation you wish to have addressed . This proposal addresses price ... violations , to allow it only for noncriminal violations , or perhaps allow ...
Page 25
... Antitrust, Monopoly, and Business Rights. Contribution is the equitable ... antitrust damage cases , contribution would create a right of action by one defendant ... violations by seeing not only that antitrust violators are forced to ...
... Antitrust, Monopoly, and Business Rights. Contribution is the equitable ... antitrust damage cases , contribution would create a right of action by one defendant ... violations by seeing not only that antitrust violators are forced to ...
Page 27
... antitrust litigation as it is in criminal cases , but there are other ways to describe antitrust violations for the purpose of determining when to allow contribution . Contribution could be allowed for all antitrust violations , only ...
... antitrust litigation as it is in criminal cases , but there are other ways to describe antitrust violations for the purpose of determining when to allow contribution . Contribution could be allowed for all antitrust violations , only ...
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Common terms and phrases
allowing contribution amount anti Antitrust Equal Enforcement antitrust laws antitrust litigation antitrust violations attorneys Bayh amendment bill Birch Bayh Cessna Chairman civil class action suits Clayton Act committee complex concern CONGRESS THE LIBRARY contribution in antitrust contribution rule COOPER Corp Corporation counsel criminal cross-claim District Court eighth circuit Equal Enforcement Amendment fairness Federal filed Green Bay Packaging guilty Hibner Illinois Brick Co industry involved issue joint judgment jury KEMPF KOHN KRESS lawsuit lawyers legislation liability LIBRARY OF CONGRESS market share MARKET STREET PHILADELPHIA ment million Nolo plea nonsettling defendants parties permitting contribution plaintiffs potential price-fixing price-fixing conspiracy problem Professional Beauty Supply proposed question remaining defendants right of contribution risk Sachnoff Scanlon Senator BAUCUS Senator BAYH Senator METZENBAUM Senator THURMOND settling defendant Shapiro sharing agreement SHENEFIELD situation small defendants statement subcommittee tion tort tortfeasors treble damage trust laws Westvaco Westvaco Corporation
Popular passages
Page 112 - There is obvious lack of sense and justice in a rule which permits the entire burden of a loss, for which two defendants were equally, unintentionally responsible, to be shouldered onto one alone, according to the accident of a successful levy of execution, the existence of liability insurance, the...
Page 73 - ... was undertaken, holds out the distinct possibility of overdeterrence; salutary and procompetitive conduct lying close to the borderline of impermissible conduct might be shunned by businessmen who chose to be excessively cautious in the face of uncertainty regarding possible exposure to criminal punishment for even a good-faith error of judgment.
Page 69 - more equal distribution of justice" can best be achieved by ameliorating the common-law rule against contribution which permits a plaintiff to force one of two wrongdoers to bear the entire loss, though the other may have been equally or more to blame.
Page 84 - A release, covenant not to sue, or similar agreement entered into by a claimant and a person liable discharges that person from all liability for contribution, but it does not discharge any other persons liable upon the same claim unless it so provides. However, the claim of the releasing person against other persons is reduced by the amount of the released person's equitable share of the obligation, determined in accordance with the provisions of Section 2.
Page 122 - But even if this argument were more persuasive than it is, it could hardly be accepted. For. at bottom, it asks us to continue the operation of an archaic rule because its facile application out of court yields quick, though inequitable, settlements, and relieves the courts of some litigation.
Page 115 - ... There is an obvious lack of sense and justice in a rule which permits the entire burden of a loss, for which two defendants were equally, unintentionally responsible, to be shouldered...
Page 70 - We believe that the question of deterrence actually cuts both ways and on balance a rule allowing contribution is actually a greater deterrent. The fact that one tortfeasor may be held liable for all the damages arising from the antitrust violation necessarily means that other joint tortfeasors may go "scot free.