Ownership Structure and the Temptation to Loot: Evidence from Privatized Firms in the Czech RepublicWorld Bank, Development Research Group, Regulation and competition policy, 2001 - Corporate governance - 39 pages Evidence from the Czech Republic shows that financial incentives and regulation are as important as ownership in the design of privatization. |
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1+rı)Lo asset stripping bank-sponsored investment funds Branko Milanovic capital intensity Claessens coefficient for fund-controlled controlled by bank-sponsored controlling shareholder corporate governance cost cross-sectional regression Czech joint stock Czech limited liabilities Czech privatization Czech Republic dividend payment Domestic Fund Dominant Owner expected finance firm owners firm types fixed assets foreign-owned joint stock fraudulent activities Frydman fund-controlled joint stock incentives increase indicates significance joint stock companies liability growth rate limited liability companies looting managers Matesova maximize minority shareholders negative and significant observations output growth rate output growth regressions ownership concentration ownership structure period 1 dividend pre-tax profits(t)/total assets(t quartile R-square Regression Results return on assets ROA ROA ROA Robust Regression robustness checks selection bias shares Shleifer statistically distinguishable stock companies controlled total assets tunneling types of owners under-performed variables for industry voucher points voucher privatization Weiss and Nikitin White's SE White's White's White's White's Wijnbergen World Bank 1998