Contributions to the Theory of Market Screening |
Contents
Costly Testing I Screening and Signaling | 5 |
Appendix to Chapter 2 51 34 | 51 |
Costly Testing II Extensions and Alternatives | 54 |
Copyright | |
4 other sections not shown
Common terms and phrases
Akerlof assumption bargaining game C₁ C₂ Chapter constraint contracts implied defined definition of equilibrium equations equilibrium concepts expected return condition firm gains to trade high productivity workers high quality commodities high risk individuals highest testing offer indifference curve insurance model Intuitive Criterion Kohlberg and Mertens labor market model low productivity workers low quality commodities low risk individuals measure of sellers Miyazaki equilibrium Nash equilibrium nonexistence nonnegative profits nontesting offer optimal choice order condition payoff positive measure positive profits positive return possible posterior probability purchase offer quality commodities apply Recontracting Rothschild and Stiglitz Rothschild-Stiglitz equilibrium Section sellers apply sellers with high sellers with low sequential equilibrium set of contracts set of offers shown in Figure signaling game solution solution concept strategy strictly Theorem type C equilibrium type sellers U₁(C universal divinity value of q W₁ W₂ zero expected return zero profits