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Bargaining Problem Bargaining Process Bargaining under Strike behavioral postulates Bilateral Monopoly characterize a class class of equilibria Clemhout collective concession rate composite bargaining theory concession trajectory CORNELL UNIVERSITY defined Differential Game Model Dussaix and Haurie Econometrica economic implications equilibrium concession equilibrium strategy N-tuple Example excess claim FF locus Figure four-party bargaining model Fouraker game-theoretic group rationality H.Y. Wan Harsanyi and Selten imperfection of knowledge income initial demands iso-pay-off contour iso-pay-off surfaces Jaroslav Vanek Leitmann Leitmann-Liu Luce and Raiffa McGraw-Hill Book Model of Bargaining modify their demands Mukul Majumdar multi-stage games N-l players N-person Nash Solution negotiation non-negative o o o o Pareto Optimal pay-off function pay-off pair Pierre Pestieau playable real-life Remark representable by vectors S.C. Tsiang settlement terms shares Terminal manifold terms of settlement threat e.g. trade-off ratios uniquely determined University of California Uri Possen Vector of Outcome vectors 0^1 wasteful strike xlx1 xo,to xo,tQ zero-preserving Zeuthen-Hicks