The Fœderalist: A Collection of Essays, Written in Favor of the New Constitution, as Agreed Upon by the Fœderal Convention, September 17, 1787. Reprinted from the Original Text. With an Historical Introduction and Notes, Volume 1
C. Scribner, 1864 - Constitutional history - 615 pages
Essays written by Alexander Hamilton, James Madison and John Jay under pseudonym of "Publius."
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advantage Alexander Hamilton America appear appointment armies Articles of Confederation authority body Britain circumstances citizens civil list commerce common Confederacy Congress consideration considered Convention copy Council Court danger defence delegated departments duties edition elections equal eral ernment established Executive existence experience extent faction favor Fcederal Government federacies Federalist force foreign former greater Hamilton important Independent Journal influence interests jealousy Judiciary jurisdiction latter laws Legislative Legislature less liberty Macedon Madison means ment military militia National Government National Intelligencer nature necessary necessity objects octavo officers paper particular parties passions peace Peofle persons political possess President principle probably proclamation of neutrality proper proposed Constitution propriety provision PUBLIUS reason regulation remarks render Representatives republic republican requisite respect revenue Senate Sparta taxation taxes tion treaties Union United usurpation verso volume York Evening Post York Packet
Page 311 - No state shall, without the consent of congress, lay any duty on tonnage, keep troops or ships of war in time of peace, enter into any agreement or compact with another state or with a foreign power, or engage in war, unless actually invaded or in such imminent danger as will not admit of delay.
Page 58 - So strong is this propensity of mankind to fall into mutual animosities, that where no substantial occasion presents itself, the most frivolous and fanciful distinctions have been sufficient to kindle their unfriendly pas/sions and excite their most violent conflicts. But the most common and durable source of factions has been the various and unequal distribution of property.
Page 267 - Philadelphia for the sole and express purpose of revising the Articles of Confederation and reporting to Congress and the several legislatures such alterations and provisions therein as shall when agreed to in Congress and confirmed by the States render the Federal Constitution adequate to the exigencies of Government and the preservation of the Union.
Page 338 - In the government of this Commonwealth, the legislative department shall never exercise the executive and judicial powers, or either of them : the executive shall never exercise the legislative and judicial powers, or either of them : the judicial shall never exercise the legislative and executive powers, or either of them: to the end it may be a government of laws and not of men.
Page 541 - ... that as nothing can contribute so much to its firmness and independence as permanency in office — this quality may, therefore, be justly regarded as an indispensable ingredient in its constitution, and in a great measure as the citadel of the public justice and the public security. The complete independence of the courts of justice is peculiarly essential in a limited constitution.
Page 171 - That the raising or keeping a standing army within the kingdom in time of peace, unless it be with consent of parliament, is against law.
Page 336 - When the legislative and executive powers are united in the same person, or in the same body of magistrates, there can be no liberty ; because apprehensions may arise, lest the same monarch or senate should enact tyrannical laws, to execute them in a tyrannical manner.
Page 542 - ... the Constitution ought to be preferred to the statute, the intention of the people to the intention of their agents.
Page 310 - Bills of attainder, ex post facto laws, and laws impairing the obligation of contracts, are contrary to the first principles of the social compact, and to every principle of sound legislation.