Dynamic Common Agency |
Common terms and phrases
agent alternative at+1 Bergemann Bernheim & Whinston best response characterization coalition proof common agency game common agency model Consider continuation payoffs contribution equilibrium exists contribution of principal defined denoted deterministic dynamic coalition-proof equilibrium dynamic common agency dynamic game efficient employers equi equilibrium payoffs equivalent flow contribution flow marginal contribution follows grand coalition greedy algorithm hence inequality intertemporal job matching model librium Lies Mi marginal contribution equilibrium Markov Perfect Equilibrium Markov strategies Markovian maximal Mi 0t modified program multi-armed bandit Nash equilibrium notion optimal action optimal policy payoff matrix payoff relevant perfect information period players principal receives program â proof equilibrium Proof of Theorem realization renegotiation-proofness restriction reward function satisfied sequence social value spot wages static common agency subadditive subset sufficient condition SW_i task transferable utility truthful strategies unique truthful equilibrium W 0t weak superadditivity Whinston 1986a ΣΜ