 | United States. Congress. Senate. Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs - 1989 - 320 lapas
...insider abuse and fraud to delay any enforcement action that would stop such abuses. Those abusing a thrift have the strongest incentive to use the arbitration...loss reserves for substandard assets, and have no arbitration /appeal mechanism. Our sister regulatory agencies unanimously oppose such forbearance"... | |
 | United States. Congress. Senate. Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs - 1989 - 334 lapas
...loss. This is a perfect device for those engaged in insider abuse and fraud to delay any enforcement If the House truly believed that these provisions...loss reserves for substandard assets, and have no arbitration /appeal mechanism. Our sister regulatory agencies unanimously oppose such forbearance"... | |
 | United States. Congress. House. Committee on Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs - 1989 - 1168 lapas
...fraud to delay any enforcement action that would stop such abuses. Those abusing a thrift have th« strongest incentive to use the arbitration mechanism....If the House truly believed that these provisions w«r« desirable. it would have applied then to our sister banking regulatory agencies who also... | |
 | United States. Congress. Senate. Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs - 1989 - 330 lapas
...insider abuse and fraud to delay any enforcement action that would stop such abuses. Those abusing a thrift have the strongest incentive to use the arbitration...arbiters' costs is plainly irrelevant to such insiders. If th» House truly believed that the*« provisions wer« desirable, it would have applied then to our... | |
 | United States. Congress. House. Committee on Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs - 1989 - 1168 lapas
...enforcement action that would stop such abuses. Those abusing a thrift have the strongest incentive te use the arbitration mechanism. The fact that the thrift...to such insiders. If the House truly believed that th»*» provision* were desirable. It would hav« applied them to our sister banking regulatory agencieswho... | |
 | United States. Congress. House. Committee on Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs - 1989 - 1174 lapas
...enforcement action that would stop such abuses. Those abusing a thrift have the strongest incentive to us* the arbitration mechanism. The fact that the thrift...to such insiders. If the House truly believed that tn«*» provision* w«r« desirable. It would have applied them to our sister banking regulatory agencieswho... | |
 | United States. Congress. Senate. Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs - 1989 - 328 lapas
...insider abuse and fraud to delay any enforcement action that would stop such abuses. Those abusing a thrift have the strongest incentive to use the arbitration...the thrift has to pay the arbiters' costs is plainly irr»2»vont to such insiders. (hytflß If the Hous* truly believed that these provision« wer» desirable,... | |
 | United States. Congress. House. Committee on Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs - 1989 - 1390 lapas
...insider abuse and fraud to delay any enforcement action that would stop such abuses. Those abusing a thrift have the strongest incentive to use the arbitration mechanism. The fact that the thrift ha* to pay the arbiters' costs is plainly irrelevant to such insiders. If the House truly believed... | |
 | United States. Congress. House. Committee on Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs - 1990 - 1082 lapas
...insider abuse and fraud to dalay any enforcement action that would stop such abuses. Those abusing a thrift have the strongest incentive to use the arbitration mechanism. The fact that the thrift has to pay tho arbiters' costs ia plainly irrelevant to sucn insidor*. If tne> Mowee truly b«li«v»d tflot th««»... | |
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... The House bill creates an elaborate appeal and arbitration mechanism that can be used whenever a supervisory agent requires a thrift to recognize a loss. This is a perfect device for those engaged in insider abuse and fraud to delay any enforcement... 