A Review of Major Strategic Weapons Program: Reports of the Subcommittees on Research and Development and Procurement and Military Nuclear Systems of the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives and the U.S. General Accounting Office, One Hundredth Congress, Second Session

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U.S. Government Printing Office, 1988 - B-1 bomber - 225 pages
 

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Page 140 - Congress after such programs had been approved by the Secretary of the Air Force and the Secretary of Defense.
Page 80 - ... way these uncertainties are resolved will inevitably influence the size and nature of the program. We should keep in mind, however, that having several different modes of deployment may serve our objective of stability. The objective for the United States should be to have an overall program that will so confound, complicate, and frustrate the efforts of Soviet strategic war planners that, even in moments of stress, they could not believe that they could attack our ICBM forces effectively.
Page 119 - It was recognized that achieving it would require a high degree of concurrency between development and production and in fact some development and production contracts were signed on the same day.
Page 81 - Land-mobile deployments without hard launchers could be threatened by a relatively small attack — in the absence of an appropriate arms control agreement — unless our own missiles were distributed widely across the country in peacetime. The key advantages of a small singlewarhead missile are that it would reduce the value of each strategic target and that it is also compatible with either fixed or mobile deployments, or with combinations of the two. As discussed below...
Page 178 - Committee on Armed Services House of Representatives Dear Mr. Chairman: As requested, we reviewed the Ready Reserve Force program. Our analysis included the ships...
Page 40 - ... apparently capable of supporting the MGCS Test Schedule contains suspect capacitor assemblies and places the guidance system qualification at risk." Then, in your June 10, 1986 letter in response to the April 1986 OSI investigative report that BMO requested in October 1985 you state: "with the exception of the. . .certification of the heat exchanger testing, I believe that all of the allegations raised are baseless. In each instance, the acts were the product of the development process of a highly...
Page 69 - The cost variance is due to increased effort in attempting to recover schedule in the hybrid area and higher than planned hybrid costs.
Page 140 - Systems (GPS) navigation system, nuclear safety devices, and classified weapons currently under development. None of these enhancements has been formally added to the program or included in program costs.
Page 80 - It should have sufficient accuracy and yield to put Soviet hardened military targets at risk. During that period an approach toward arms control, consistent with such deployments, should also seek to encourage the Soviets to move toward a more stable ICBM force structure at levels which would obviate the need to deploy very large numbers of such missiles. The...
Page 66 - Management was unsatisfactory. A major problem Mas the massive loss of accountability over government owned materials Including components containing precious metal. Also, large quantities of materials were backlogged for disposal. Industrial Safety and Fire Protection was satisfactory. Management support and Increased safety awareness were noteworthy. There continues to be some concern 1n the handling and control of hazardous materials and waste, warehouse discipline, and safety of machinery.

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