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absolute abstract and universal abstract thought-objects actual existence agnosticism analysis apprehended Aristotle assent attain attitude belief called causality cogent conceived concrete connexion consciousness Criteriology critical Critique data of sense datum Descartes distinct domain empirical epistemology error essence evidence extramental fact factors faculties function grounds human mind ibid inasmuch individual intellect interpretation involved JEANNIERE judging Kant Kant's theory knowing subject latter Leibniz manifold means mental Mercier merely merus metaphysical methodic doubt mode Moderate Realism monism moral nature necessarily necessary and universal objective validity objects of knowledge Ontology phenomena philosophical physical Plato possible predicate present PRichard principles priori forms problem pure question quod real doubt real objectivity reason reflection regard relation representations revealed scepticism scholastic scholasticism Science of Logic sense data sense experience sense intuition sense perception speculative reason spontaneous convictions subjectivism suprasensible synthesis things tion transcendental true truth understanding unity universal concepts universal judgments whereby
Page 151 - ALL the objects of human reason or enquiry may naturally be divided into two kinds, to wit, Relations of Ideas, and Matters of Fact. Of the first kind are the sciences of Geometry, Algebra, and Arithmetic; and in short, every affirmation, which is either intuitively or demonstratively certain.
Page 174 - THAT all our knowledge begins with experience there can be no doubt. For how is it possible that the faculty of cognition should be awakened into exercise otherwise than by means of objects which affect our senses, and partly of themselves produce representations...
Page 174 - But though all our knowledge begins with experience, it does not follow that it all arises out of experience. For it may well be that even our empirical knowledge is made up of what we receive through impressions and of what our own faculty of knowledge (sensible impressions serving merely as the occasion) supplies from itself.
Page 181 - I please, provided only I do not contradict myself ; that is, provided my conception is a possible thought, though I may be unable to answer for the existence of a corresponding object in the sum of possibilities.
Page 151 - Propositions of this kind are discoverable by the mere operation of thought, without dependence on what is anywhere existent in the universe. Though there never were a circle or triangle in nature, the truths demonstrated by Euclid would for ever retain their certainty and evidence.
Page 219 - We might, indeed, at first suppose that the proposition 7 + 5 = 12 is a merely analytic proposition, and follows by the principle of contradiction from the concept of a sum of 7 and 5. But if we look more closely we find that the concept of the sum of 7 and 5 contains nothing save the union of the two numbers into one, and in this no thought is being taken as to what that single number may be which combines both.
Page 223 - ... every alteration must have a cause," will serve our purpose. In the latter case, indeed, the very concept of a cause so manifestly contains the concept of a necessity of connection with an effect and of the strict universality of the rule, that the concept would be altogether lost if we attempted to derive it, as Hume has done, from a repeated association of that which happens with that which precedes, and from a custom of connecting...
Page 26 - Knowledge unconditionally presupposes that the reality known exists independently of the knowledge of it, and that we know it as it exists in this independence.
Page 175 - If an example from the sciences be desired, we have only to look to any of the propositions of mathematics; if we seek an example from the understanding in its quite ordinary employment, the proposition, 'every alteration must have a cause,