Mind, Meaning, and Knowledge: Themes from the Philosophy of Crispin Wright

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Annalisa Coliva
OUP Oxford, Sep 27, 2012 - Philosophy - 494 pages
This volume is a collective exploration of major themes in the work of Crispin Wright, one of today's leading philosophers. These newly commissioned papers are divided into four sections, preceded by a substantial Introduction, which places them in the context of the development of Wright's ideas. The distinguished contributors address issues such as the rule-following problem, knowledge of our meanings and minds, truth, realism, anti-realism and relativism, as well as the nature of perceptual justification, the cogency of arguments such as G. E. Moore's celebrated proof of an external world, and scepticism about the material world. Some papers explore the relationship of Wright's ideas with those of Ludwig Wittgenstein, whose influence has always been a prominent aspect of Wright's philosophy. The essays collectively testify to the enormous interest and relevance of Wright's seminal contributions for present-day debates in areas as diverse as the philosophy of language and mind, metaphysics, and epistemology, and significantly advance research in these areas. The volume also contains Wright's substantial responses to his critics, which offer the most up-to-date versions of his ideas and a vigorous defence of his philosophy.

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Biobibliographical Note
Section I RuleFollowing and the Normativity of Meaning
Section II Knowledge of Our Own Minds and Meanings
Section III Truth Objectivity and Relativism
Section IV Warrant Transmission Failure and Scepticism
Index Nominum

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About the author (2012)

Annalisa Coliva is Associate Professor at the University of Modena and Reggio Emilia (Italy) and Associate Director of COGITO Research Centre in Philosophy (Bologna). A Fulbright and Alexander von Humboldt Fellow, Coliva's main publications include Moore and Wittgenstein: Scepticism, Certainty and
Common Sense (Palgrave, 2010) and, as editor, The Self and Self-Knowledge (OUP, 2012). She has published widely in Italian and English in epistemology, philosophy of mind and language, and history of analytic philosophy and is now working, with Daniele Moyal-Sharrock, on a collected volume titled
Hinge Epistemology: Basic Beliefs After Moore and Wittgenstein.

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