Mind, Meaning, and Knowledge: Themes from the Philosophy of Crispin Wright
OUP Oxford, Sep 27, 2012 - Philosophy - 494 pages
This volume is a collective exploration of major themes in the work of Crispin Wright, one of today's leading philosophers. These newly commissioned papers are divided into four sections, preceded by a substantial Introduction, which places them in the context of the development of Wright's ideas. The distinguished contributors address issues such as the rule-following problem, knowledge of our meanings and minds, truth, realism, anti-realism and relativism, as well as the nature of perceptual justification, the cogency of arguments such as G. E. Moore's celebrated proof of an external world, and scepticism about the material world. Some papers explore the relationship of Wright's ideas with those of Ludwig Wittgenstein, whose influence has always been a prominent aspect of Wright's philosophy. The essays collectively testify to the enormous interest and relevance of Wright's seminal contributions for present-day debates in areas as diverse as the philosophy of language and mind, metaphysics, and epistemology, and significantly advance research in these areas. The volume also contains Wright's substantial responses to his critics, which offer the most up-to-date versions of his ideas and a vigorous defence of his philosophy.
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Section I RuleFollowing and the Normativity of Meaning
Section II Knowledge of Our Own Minds and Meanings
Section III Truth Objectivity and Relativism
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acceptance anti-realism anti-realist argue argument ascriptions assumption avowals behavior belief Bilgrami Bob Hale Boghossian claim cognitive command conception conclusion constituted cornerstones cosmological role Crispin Wright deflationism disagreement discourse distinction entails entitlement epistemology essay ethical evidence example experience explain expression expressivism expressivist external world externalist fact first-person Frege Fregean fundamental reference rule G. E. M. Anscombe Horwich idea inference Intention View intuitive involve issue judgment justification kind Kripke Kripke’s language law of non-contradiction linguistic logical mental metaphysical mind Modus Ponens Moore’s Proof Moorean notion one’s Oxford University Press particular perceptual warrant philosophical possible premises problem proposal proposition Pryor psychological question reason relativism relevant rule-following s-express scepticism seems self-knowledge semantic Semantic Externalism sense sentence meaning speaker subpersonal suppose tacit knowledge theory things thinker thought transmission failure true truth-conditions understanding utterances warrant to believe Wittgenstein words Wright Zebra-3